

A SURVEY OF SELECTED PEACE OPERATIONS DOCTRINES, AND THE
UTILITY OF CURRENT US ARMY PEACE OPERATIONS DOCTRINE

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the degree requirements

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE


by

THOMAS F. GRECO, MAJ, USA
B.A., HUNTER COLLEGE OF THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK, 1980

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
1995

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

19951011 058

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE			Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188), Washington, DC 20503.				
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)	2. REPORT DATE 2 June 1995	3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED Master's Thesis, 2 Aug 94 - 2 Jun 95		
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE A Survey of Selected Peace Operations Doctrines, and the Utility of Current U.S. ^{Army} Peace Operations Doctrine		5. FUNDING NUMBERS		
6. AUTHOR(S) Major Thomas F. Greco, U.S. Army				
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) U.S. Army Command and General Staff College ATTN: ATZL-SWD-GD Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027-6900		8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER		
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)		10. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER		
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES				
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release, distribution is unlimited.				
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE A		13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words) This paper examines the development of selected peace operations doctrines. The concept of peacekeeping was first articulated by United Nations (UN) Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld and manifests itself in the Nordic model of traditional peacekeeping. From the discussion of Nordic peacekeeping, this paper examines the writings of the current leadership of the United Nations. The UN leadership sought to redefine the use of the military to resolve disputes. In response to the UN's call for changes, the United States and the United Kingdom developed new peace operations doctrine. This paper examines how the newly written British and US doctrine address the range of military missions between peace and war. U.S. doctrine is heavily influenced by the requirement for force protection. This requirement causes U.S. doctrine to be over reliant on the use of force and maintenance of a retaliatory capability. The U.S. military should develop alternative means to resolve a crisis since the use of force could cause escalation.		
14. SUBJECT TERMS Peace Operations Doctrine		15. NUMBER OF PAGES 105		16. PRICE CODE
DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 5				
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT Unclassified	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE Unclassified	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT Unclassified	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT Unlimited	

GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMPLETING SF 298

The Report Documentation Page (RDP) is used in announcing and cataloging reports. It is important that this information be consistent with the rest of the report, particularly the cover and title page. Instructions for filling in each block of the form follow. It is important to *stay within the lines* to meet *optical scanning requirements*.

Block 1. Agency Use Only (Leave blank).

Block 2. Report Date. Full publication date including day, month, and year, if available (e.g. 1 Jan 88). Must cite at least the year.

Block 3. Type of Report and Dates Covered. State whether report is interim, final, etc. If applicable, enter inclusive report dates (e.g. 10 Jun 87 - 30 Jun 88).

Block 4. Title and Subtitle. A title is taken from the part of the report that provides the most meaningful and complete information. When a report is prepared in more than one volume, repeat the primary title, add volume number, and include subtitle for the specific volume. On classified documents enter the title classification in parentheses.

Block 5. Funding Numbers. To include contract and grant numbers; may include program element number(s), project number(s), task number(s), and work unit number(s). Use the following labels:

C - Contract	PR - Project
G - Grant	TA - Task
PE - Program Element	WU - Work Unit Accession No.

Block 6. Author(s). Name(s) of person(s) responsible for writing the report, performing the research, or credited with the content of the report. If editor or compiler, this should follow the name(s).

Block 7. Performing Organization Name(s) and Address(es). Self-explanatory.

Block 8. Performing Organization Report Number. Enter the unique alphanumeric report number(s) assigned by the organization performing the report.

Block 9. Sponsoring/Monitoring Agency Name(s) and Address(es). Self-explanatory.

Block 10. Sponsoring/Monitoring Agency Report Number. (If known)

Block 11. Supplementary Notes. Enter information not included elsewhere such as: Prepared in cooperation with...; Trans. of...; To be published in.... When a report is revised, include a statement whether the new report supersedes or supplements the older report.

Block 12a. Distribution/Availability Statement. Denotes public availability or limitations. Cite any availability to the public. Enter additional limitations or special markings in all capitals (e.g. NOFORN, REL, ITAR).

DOD - See DoDD 5230.24, "Distribution Statements on Technical Documents."

DOE - See authorities.

NASA - See Handbook NHB 2200.2.

NTIS - Leave blank.

Block 12b. Distribution Code.

DOD - Leave blank.

DOE - Enter DOE distribution categories from the Standard Distribution for Unclassified Scientific and Technical Reports.

NASA - Leave blank.

NTIS - Leave blank.

Block 13. Abstract. Include a brief (*Maximum 200 words*) factual summary of the most significant information contained in the report.

Block 14. Subject Terms. Keywords or phrases identifying major subjects in the report.

Block 15. Number of Pages. Enter the total number of pages.

Block 16. Price Code. Enter appropriate price code (*NTIS only*).

Blocks 17. - 19. Security Classifications. Self-explanatory. Enter U.S. Security Classification in accordance with U.S. Security Regulations (i.e., UNCLASSIFIED). If form contains classified information, stamp classification on the top and bottom of the page.

Block 20. Limitation of Abstract. This block must be completed to assign a limitation to the abstract. Enter either UL (unlimited) or SAR (same as report). An entry in this block is necessary if the abstract is to be limited. If blank, the abstract is assumed to be unlimited.

A SURVEY OF SELECTED PEACE OPERATIONS DOCTRINES, AND THE
UTILITY OF CURRENT US ARMY PEACE OPERATIONS DOCTRINE

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the degree requirements

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

THOMAS F. GRECO, MAJ, USA

B.A., HUNTER COLLEGE OF THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK, 1980

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
1995

Accession For	
NTIS CRA&I	<input checked="checked" type="checkbox"/>
DTIC TAB	<input type="checkbox"/>
Unannounced	<input type="checkbox"/>
Justification	
By	
Distribution /	
Availability Codes	
Dist	Avail and/or Special
A-1	

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
APPROVAL PAGE	ii
ABSTRACT	iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	iv
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS	v
 CHAPTER	
1. INTRODUCTION	1
2. THE NORDICS' TRADITIONAL PEACEKEEPING	8
3. AN AGENDA FOR PEACE	21
4. BRITISH WIDER PEACEKEEPING	37
5. UNITED STATES PEACE OPERATIONS DOCTRINE	53
6. CONCLUSIONS	76
ENDNOTES	84
BIBLIOGRAPHY	95
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST	99


MASTER OF MILITARY ARTS AND SCIENCE

THESIS APPROVAL

Name of Candidate: Major Thomas F. Greco

Thesis Title: A Survey of Selected Peace Operations Doctrines and the
Utility of Current US Army Peace Operations Doctrine


Approved by:

 , Thesis Committee Chairman
Major Michael D. Plumley, M.B.A.

 , Member
Lieutenant Colonel Thomas K. Adams, Ph.D.

 , Member
Mr. John B. Hunt, J.D.

Accepted this 2d day of June 1995 by:

 , Director, Graduate Degree Programs
Philip J. Brookes, Ph.D.

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the United States Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

A SURVEY OF SELECTED PEACE OPERATIONS DOCTRINES, AND THE UTILITY
OF CURRENT US PEACE OPERATIONS DOCTRINE by Major Thomas F.
Greco, US Army, 99 Pages.

This paper examines the development of selected peace operations doctrines.

The concept of peacekeeping was first articulated by United Nations (UN) Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld and manifests itself in the Nordic model of traditional peacekeeping. From the discussion of Nordic peacekeeping, this paper examines the writings of the current leadership of the United Nations.

The UN leadership sought to redefine the use of the military to resolve disputes. In response to the UN's call for changes, the United States and the United Kingdom developed new peace operations doctrine.

This paper examines how the newly written British and US doctrines address the range of military missions between peace and war.

US doctrine is heavily influenced by the requirement for force protection. This requirement causes US doctrine to be over reliant on the use of force and maintenance of a retaliatory capability. The US military should develop alternative means to resolve a crisis since the use of force could cause escalation.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to acknowledge the encouragement and sacrifices of my wife, Alice, and my children, Mary and Joseph, both during the preparation of this thesis and during the time I was deployed to former Yugoslavia.

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Figure	<u>Page</u>
1. SOURCES OF PEACE OPERATIONS DOCTRINE	2
2. CONTINUUM OF PEACE OPERATIONS	38
3. BRITISH PEACE OPERATIONS MODEL	39
4. REVISED BRITISH MODEL	42
5. KUTTER'S MODEL	43
6. OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR MISSIONS	54
7. HARVARD FELLOWS' MODEL	55
8. FM 100-23 PEACE OPERATIONS MODEL	63
9. DURCH'S MODEL	65
10. LAST'S MODEL	66


CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

"Peace Operations are in addition to, not instead of (war).

. . . in addition to, not instead of."¹ With these words, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General John Shalikashvili, counseled a Task Force from the 25th Infantry Division. The Task Force, which was built around a reinforced Infantry Battalion with Brigade, Division, and Corps support, was involved in the second peace operations rotation at the Joint Readiness Training Center, Fort Polk, Louisiana. The rotation included representatives from International Organizations and military officers from other nations. The training was observed by both the Chairman and the United States Ambassador to the United Nations Madeline Albright. The Chairman reminded the Task Force that the current realities are inescapable: United States combat troops must be prepared to conduct peace operations. With United States forces deployed throughout an increasingly more unstable world, the requirement for soldiers to be able to do more than traditional war fighting is growing.

In order to fully understand how the United States Army has developed its current doctrine for peace operations, this paper examines the historical development of peace operations doctrines, as shown in figure 1 on the following page. The concept of peacekeeping was first articulated by United Nations Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld. His thinking manifests itself in what became traditional Nordic peace keeping traditions. From the study of Nordic peacekeeping, this paper examines how the current leadership of the United Nations sought to



redefine the use of the military in support of multinational ends in the changing landscape of international relations. In response to the United Nations' call for changes, there emerged new doctrines on peace operations. This paper then examines how British doctrine addressed the range of military missions between peacekeeping and war. Lastly, this paper examines recently published United States Army doctrine on peace operations and analyzes the various writings to determine if there are inadequacies in United States doctrine.

United Nations Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld's concept for peacekeeping resulted in the first effective manifestation of this doctrine, the development of Nordic United Nations peacekeeping. The Dag Hammarskjöld Doctrine as exemplified by Nordic peacekeeping, served the United Nations well until the end of the Cold War.²

As the Cold War ended, new violence erupted within states and between states. With this new violence came many new challenges for both policy makers and those who execute policy. Some of these challenges were met by new or revised collective security arrangements. One of these new arrangements was an expanded role for United Nations peacekeeping.

The foundation for post-Cold War peacekeeping is described in the written works of current United Nations Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali and the current Undersecretary General for peacekeeping operations, Kofi Annan. Though the authors capture the thought that

peace operations have changed, they do not truly understand the magnitude or the implications of the changes in peace operations.⁴ Most importantly, they fail to understand that nations will not surrender command of their forces to the United Nations to conduct peace enforcement. Nations balk at peace enforcement because peace enforcement is dramatically different in character from peacekeeping. The transition from peacekeeping to peace enforcement is not a simple glide; it requires troops with different training, equipment, and a different mandate.⁵

One attempt to define the area between peace enforcement and peacekeeping is the British Army's manual on wider peacekeeping. In it, the British give an explanation of the difference between peacekeeping and peace enforcement and why they have fundamentally different requirements. Further, they offer a good doctrine for those missions that fall between the peacekeeping and peace enforcement. They also offer good guidelines on the nature of these various missions and on training to prepare for these new requirements. Given the British Army's experiences in Oman and Malaysia, as well as its continuing involvement in Northern Ireland, the British have had ample opportunities to consider the many uses of the military beyond war fighting.⁶

The United States Army's new Field Manual 100-23, Peace Operations, as well as the Army's capstone doctrinal document, Field Manual 100-5, Operations, address the needs of the United States Army in operations that it may undertake, but both have some inadequacies. The comparison of current United States Army doctrine to that of the British, the writings of United Nations leaders and Nordics doctrine finds similarities, conflicts and exclusions. United States Army

doctrine can be judged on its adequacy to fulfill the Chairman's charge to do peace operations in addition to, not instead of, war fighting.

United States Army doctrine very well articulates the existence of the different types of peace operations addressed in other nations' doctrine. However, while the mission categories are considered to be different, the United States doctrinal approach to each is identical in one respect. That is, no matter what the mission category, the United States never relinquishes the alternative of augmenting peace operations forces with war fighting forces. The United States will not relinquish the possibility of stern unilateral action. The United States can assume this doctrinal position because it is a great power. However, as reassuring as a massive retaliation capability may be to Americans, it may not be the appropriate means to set the conditions for a diplomatic solution. The purpose of peace operations as stated in United States Army doctrine is to use the military to assist in setting conditions for diplomatic solutions.⁷

In the United States Army Field Manual 100-23, doctrine is defined as "fundamental principles by which military forces guide their actions in support of national objectives; doctrine is authoritative but requires judgment in application."⁸ Doctrine is used in this paper as defined in Field Manual 100-23.

There are certain principles that are described in each type of peace operations doctrine examined. These principles guide leaders and soldiers alike by setting a common framework upon which appropriate decisions can be made. Doctrinal principles are authoritative and reflect the accepted beliefs of the organization. These beliefs indicate how the organization perceives the tasks to be performed and the communally accepted approach to accomplishing these tasks.

Other terms that are used frequently in this paper are peace operations, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, peacemaking, and peace building. The term peace operations is "an umbrella term that encompasses three types of activities; activities with a predominantly diplomatic lead (preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peace building) and two complementary predominantly military activities (peacekeeping and peace enforcement)."⁹ Peacekeeping operations are "military or paramilitary operations undertaken with the consent of all major belligerents; designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an existing truce and support diplomatic efforts to reach long-term political settlement."¹⁰ Peace enforcement is the application of military force or the threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with generally accepted resolutions or sanctions.¹¹ Peacemaking is "a process of diplomacy, mediation, negotiation, or other form of peaceful settlement that arranges an end to disputes and resolves issues that led to conflict."¹² Peace building consists of "post conflict actions, primarily diplomatic, that strengthen and rebuild civil infrastructures and institutions in order to avoid a relapse into conflict."¹³

With the end of World War II, the new United Nations revived the prospects for international enforcement of peace. Under the provisions of Chapter Seven, that is articles 39-47 of the United Nations Charter, the United Nations has the ability to raise credible military forces. Under article 43, member states were to make available to the United Nations armed forces to maintain international peace and security. Under article 47, a Military Staff Committee with a representative of the head of the militaries from each of the permanent members was to

help the Security Council employ the United Nations's military assets.¹⁴

The Military Staff Committee has never taken an active role in peacekeeping or any other decision making.¹⁵

It is not under Chapter Seven that most peacekeeping missions derive their legitimacy. Nor is it under Chapter Six, which is the authority of the United Nations to seek peaceful settlements to disputes. In fact, peacekeeping is never specifically mentioned in the United Nations Charter. However, peacekeeping has evolved under the United Nations, and continues to evolve today.

Peacekeeping as a concept is not specifically described in the United Nations Charter. It goes beyond purely diplomatic means for the peaceful settlement of disputes described in Chapter Six, but falls short of the military or other enforcement provisions of Chapter Seven. As former Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld stated, peacekeeping might be put in a new Chapter "Six and a half." Peacekeeping has evolved over the years as a flexible, internationally acceptable way of controlling conflicts and promoting the peaceful settlement of disputes. This technique-born of necessity, largely improvised, and used as a practical response to a problem requiring action-partly compensated for the impaired ability of the Security Council to function fully during the cold war.¹⁶

The United Nations was involved in military operations before the terms peacekeeping and peace enforcement were developed. The beginning of United Nations peacekeeping took place during the tenure of Dag Hammarskjöld.¹⁷

Following the deployments of the United Nations Emergency Force in the Middle East (1956-1967) and the Organizations des Nations Unies au Congo (United Nations Organization in the Congo, 1960-1964) Secretary Dag Hammarskjöld devised the first set of principles for peacekeeping forces. This is often referred to as the Hammarskjöld Doctrine:

The United Nations can only station troops with consent of the host country.

The United Nations alone decides on the composition of the forces.
Major powers will not provide contingents.
Freedom of movement in the zone of operations is required.
United Nations personnel can not be a party to any internal
conflict/strict impartiality must be maintained.
A United Nations force is an instrument for conciliation and cannot
engage in combat activities except for self-defense.¹⁸

In examining Hammarskjöld's criteria one uncovers the
fundamental premises that guided United Nations peacekeeping up to the
1990s. There was a lack of consensus in the Security Council caused by
the great powers' different agendas. (The great powers are defined as
the permanent members of the Security Council: France, Great Britain,
China, United States, and Russia. Russia is holding the seat formerly
held by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and China is represented
by the government on the Mainland.) The Hammarskjöld criteria were
satisfactory for peacekeeping operations. The great powers, seeking an
edge over each other, would limit the number of missions undertaken.
Now the great powers have more mutual interests; or, at the very least,
they share a motivation to cooperate as compensation for acquiescence or
cooperation on other issues. This cooperation has given birth to a
number of new peace operations. With the range of new peace operations
the Hammarskjöld criteria seemed to become inadequate.

CHAPTER 2

THE NORDICS' TRADITIONAL PEACEKEEPING

The four Nordic nations Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden, have cooperated with each other in many ways on matters pertaining to the United Nations. Among these areas of cooperation are training military personnel, rotating requirements for manning and funding of peacekeeping missions and rotating leadership positions. These positions are not only peacekeeping, but exist throughout the United Nations system.¹ In order to prepare their military personnel for United Nations duty, they have established a system of schools, written manuals, and established separate United Nations Departments within their Ministries of Defense. This Nordic peacekeeping doctrine is prescriptive, especially when compared to United States and British doctrine which is more conceptual.

Of special interest is the Nordic peacekeeping doctrine that resulted from their interpretation of peacekeeping as envisioned by Dag Hammarskjöld. This doctrine has been unanimously conceived, approved, and utilized by the four Nordic Countries. It serves as the operational manifestation of peacekeeping as envisioned by Hammarskjöld. It was, perhaps, among the finest early articulations of peacekeeping doctrine.

This chapter discusses the Nordic view of peacekeeping. The Nordic's doctrine accepts the legitimacy of the United Nations to lead a military operation. The Nordic countries have delineated roles for command and control within a peacekeeping mission between the authority of the contributing nation and the authority of the United Nations.²

Nordic doctrine discusses the aims of the United Nations, the United Nations' achievements, and the role of peacekeeping within the entire scheme of United Nations endeavors. Peacekeeping is not a unilateral action under Nordic doctrine; it must be balanced with humanitarian efforts and respect for Human Rights.

The Nordics have defined a set of principles for peacekeeping. These principles: firmness, impartiality, clarity of intention, avoidance of the use of force, anticipation, recognition of host government authority, and integration help establish the philosophical framework for peacekeeping. The Nordics distinguish between peacekeeping and United Nations military operations. United Nations military operations and peacekeeping are the only two types of missions covered in Nordic doctrine. United Nations military operations are defined as a situation when the United Nations takes direct part in hostilities. Within peacekeeping there are three types of missions: Military Observer Missions, Force Level Missions and Combined Forces and Observer Missions.³ Within the category of peacekeeping, the Nordics have included guidelines, tasks, and procedures which set the framework for military leaders to design, train, deploy, and employ military forces.

Soldiers on United Nations duty have a special identity to the Nordics beyond simply soldiering. They have a diplomatic status which brings with it responsibility to act impartially, reliably, and with the consent of the parties to the conflict.

The Nordics believe that the aims of the United Nations are of great importance. They train all personnel on these aims, which are:

1. To maintain international peace and security, and for this very purpose the United Nations must take active, collective steps in order to prevent and eliminate any threat against peace;

2. To encourage friendly relations between nations based on the regard for the right of self-determination of the peoples;
3. To contribute to international cooperation in order to solve economic, social, cultural, and humanitarian problems and strengthen the respect for human rights for all without any exception;
4. To act as the central authority in the coordination of the contribution of member states toward achieving this aim.⁴

These aims are the foundation for all the principles, guidance, and tasks that exist in Nordic doctrine. The Nordics have great respect for the United Nations; respect for its potential as well as its accomplishments.

Among the United Nations' accomplishments, the Nordics note in their United Nations Tactical Manual is: today most former colonies are free; conventions on human rights, the abolition of slavery and other issues have been signed; United Nations programs have almost eradicated smallpox; millions of refugees have been resettled; and "peacekeeping forces have supervised armistices and cease-fires preventing new clashes and so making peace negotiations possible."⁵

The Nordics point out, correctly, that peacekeeping is only a small part of the overall, worldwide mission of the United Nations. The United Nations does much more, and peacekeeping is designed to create the conditions for diplomacy. The United States Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs correctly described the misconception that peacekeeping is the main function. In an address to the Geneva Consulting Group, a *defacto* board of overseers for the United Nations, he stated

If one were to judge by the newspaper and television coverage over the past year, one would have concluded that the United Nations system is 90% peacekeeping and 10% everything else. . . . But it is there, (non peacekeeping functions of the United Nations) as much as in the area of peacekeeping, that the future of the United Nations,

and of the future quality of life on this planet, will be determined.⁶

The Nordics, like Assistant Secretary of State Bennet, see great potential for the United Nations in many areas beyond that of just peacekeeping. The Nordics have made great commitments to the United Nations, especially to United Nations peacekeeping.

Out of this somewhat idealized notion of what the United Nations can achieve, the Nordics have adopted a definition of peacekeeping. This definition is verbatim from the definition used by the International Peace Academy.

Peacekeeping is the prevention, containment, moderation, and termination of hostilities between or within states, through the medium of third party intervention organized and directed internationally, using multinational forces of soldiers, police, and civilians to restore and maintain peace.⁷

The critical elements of this definition are third party intervention; the cooperative effort of soldiers, police, and civilians, the suzerainty of the United Nations; and goal of restoring or maintaining peace. One weakness of the definition is that the medium of third party intervention is very vague. This vagueness, as to what exactly intervention means, is never adequately addressed in Nordic doctrine. Because this doctrine was constructed prior to the recent United Nations missions in Former Yugoslavia and in Somalia, the weakness of this vague definition was never adequately addressed. Despite the vagueness of that aspect of the definition, the Nordics have created a doctrine for peacekeeping with several principles that are worthy of further study. Before looking at the principles of peacekeeping, the legal standing of peacekeepers must be addressed. The legal limitations and licenses of a peace keeper, as construed by the Nordics, gives great insight into what the Nordics believe peacekeepers to be.

The legal standing of a peace keeper is firmly rooted in respect for customary law and the laws of land warfare. The rules governing behavior of a United Nations peace keeper are rooted in respect for the human rights of combatants and non combatants, the methods and means of modern warfare, those rules specified in the United Nations mandate, and host country laws (where applicable).⁸

Peacekeepers are bound by the rules of conduct for military personnel. They must safeguard human rights, an often complicated task in a divisive environment where vindictiveness and retribution would be understandable emotions. Peacekeepers, however, must bear the pains of humiliation and miss the opportunity for revenge, if doing so will advance the cause of peace.

The Nordics note that the United Nations has no internal laws governing the behavior of soldiers on United Nations duty. Rather, soldiers on United Nations duty must "respect the principles and spirit of the general international conventions applicable to the conduct of military personnel."⁹ That is peacekeepers are accountable, as are combatants, to comply with internationally accepted norms of military behavior as agreed to in conventions and by customary law. The behavior of peacekeepers is further codified by the mandate issued by the United Nations.

The Nordics believe that United Nations peacekeepers have a special status since they are not combatants in a conflict. Their presence in traditional peacekeeping is based upon high level diplomatic agreements, with the consent of the parties concerned. Peacekeepers have the status of a mediator, "an important person." This identity is obvious from the blue beret or blue helmet, the United Nations identification card, and the immunity that comes with being a

representative of the United Nations.¹⁰ The presence of Nordic peacekeepers is predicated on the acceptance of the deployment by the parties involved. The desire for parties to obtain legitimacy internationally should insure respect for United Nations peacekeepers. It is the erosion of consent to the deployment of some peacekeepers, or the lack of acceptance of their legitimacy, that has dramatically transformed the nature of peacekeeping. Even when the presence of peacekeepers was consented to, acceptance and legitimacy were not to be taken for granted. Peacekeepers had certain responsibilities to behave in a manner appropriate with the moral authority they wished to enjoy.

The code of conduct for peacekeepers consisted of behavioral limits and principles that guide behavior and decision making. The behavioral code was designed to insure that United Nations personnel were persons who deserved respect. Respect for peacekeepers was a condition for success in Nordic peacekeeping doctrine. This code directed peacekeepers to:

- Perform your duty strictly in accordance with United Nations regulations and local laws and regulations as recognized by the United Nations.
- When dealing with parties, never give them any reason to hold anything against the United Nations e.g. Smuggling.
- Be Impartial.
- Present documents, passports etc when requested.
- Act calmly, even when provoked.
- Circumstances seeming unimportant to you may be important to them, i.e. do not offend their moral standards as to the opposite sex.
- Learn local manners and customs.¹¹

This code is less doctrine than it is good advice. However, the tenets which underlie this advice, provide the principles of Nordic peacekeeping and also serve as guidance for how Nordic peacekeepers train.

Nordic doctrine, even in the explanation of principles, is prescriptive. That is, Nordic doctrine lists measures to be taken in

Jominian fashion. This is different from US and British doctrine which are less directive and more conceptual. The discussion of the principles of Nordic peacekeeping is a good example of how their doctrine is prescriptive.

Firmness is the peacekeepers' principled resolve to stand up to unacceptable actions of one or more of the parties. It is the premise of Nordic doctrine that parties would respect peacekeepers out of fear of embarrassment in front of the world, or fear of the Security Council taking actions in retribution. Action by the Security Council rarely occurred. (The sole occurrence during the Cold War was in Palestine in 1948 when a truce between Trans Jordan and Israel was ordered.)¹² It is ironic that the current difficulties that peacekeepers face is due to a lack of concern for world opinion, or lack of concern for the actions (inactions) of the Security Council.

There have been great improvements in global communications and ability of news services to transmit television images in near real time around the world. Despite these technological advances, or perhaps because of these advances, some parties in conflict show flagrant disrespect for United Nations forces. In former Yugoslavia and in Somalia, United Nations forces have been taken under attack on camera without regard for negative international opinion. In fact, these attacks have the potential to become similar to the terrorist tactic of violent acts for the sake of publicity.

Sometimes belligerents may threaten, or attack, if it feels that the Security Council will not take action. The parties may feel that they can outlast the Security Council or fracture unanimity of policy. The specific target for fracturing unanimity may be the permanent members of the Security Council, the United States, Great Britain, France, Russia, and China. Though no longer stuck in Cold War

gridlock, there are still issues that adept parties can potentially take advantage of conflicts between the Permanent Members of the Security Council. The Nordics have only a limited capability to conduct the new missions involved in peace operations caused by the new belligerence of parties against the United Nations. Nordic doctrine is applicable to a very narrow range of missions. A more in depth discussion of the changing nature of peacekeeping that is beyond the range of Nordic doctrine is contained in Chapter Three.

The next principle of Nordic peacekeeping is impartiality. Impartiality, or neutrality, is essential to maintain the trust and confidence of the parties. If peacekeepers favor one party, or appear to favor one party, the other parties will no longer trust the peacekeepers. In the absence of trust peacekeepers will have a difficult time in securing cooperation or in fulfilling their mandate.¹³

Clarity of intention is making public the goals of the operation. This is needed so all parties will know what the peacekeepers are trying to achieve and why.¹⁴

Anticipation is the ability to take decisive action before events occur. This requires peacekeepers to predict when situations will occur, before they occur, and to muster sufficient assets to prevent or defuse the situation.¹⁵

Recognition of the host government's authority is a measure to insure respect. Though peacekeepers enjoy certain immunities by virtue of their status, they must respect the host nation's customs and laws for credibility. The recognition of jurisdiction host nation laws is not required under Nordic doctrine. This is not universal. Many nations will develop status of forces agreements that spell out legal

jurisdiction. The Nordic nations treat peacekeepers as diplomats, with immunities, and host nations are expected to respect these immunities.¹⁶

Integration has two elements. The first element is that all nations deployed to a mission should share its capabilities for the good of the entire mission. This eliminates the need for redundant capabilities and insures that no nation is seen as having undue influence. The second point of integration is to insure that a multinational force is used whenever a confrontation is likely to occur. This way if there is a problem during the confrontation the diplomatic representatives from many nations can file protests.

The advantage of multiple protests is to develop a broad base of pressure on the party that causes a problem.¹⁷ This technique loses much of its power if the party causing the problem is not sensitive to international pressure. However, the United Nations has become interested in using regional bodies as an element in peacekeeping. By integrating regional bodies the United Nations would cut costs, be more efficient, and take advantage of the political weight of these bodies. For example, Kofi Annan, United Nations Undersecretary General for Peace Keeping Operations wrote:

The sheer size and complexity of peacekeeping operations makes it imperative to explore new avenues of cooperation with regional organizations such as NATO. With its (NATO's) existing military structure, resources and political weight, NATO has a lot to contribute to the concept of peacekeeping.¹⁸

Mr. Annan's hope was that by using a regional body, in this case NATO, the United Nations would be able to achieve the synergy the Nordics term integration.

The Nordics augment the principles discussed above with operational guidelines. These operational guidelines are broadly based so that they can apply in a number of situations.

The first guideline is that all personnel on a peacekeeping mission must understand what the force is trying to accomplish. The soldiers must be thoroughly briefed on the political and military situation, the customs and religions of the people and they must be kept up to date changes to the situation. Next, peacekeepers must understand the people and their problems. This will develop a reputation for sympathy and impartiality. Both US doctrine and British doctrine agree with the Nordics on the requirement for soldiers to have regional awareness. Because peacekeepers maintain a high profile, they are at constant risk of being targets. Commanders must balance this visibility and the need to project confidence, with safety.¹⁹

Decisions often have to be made quickly. Situations should be anticipated so the appropriate level of command is available to make the decisions.

Because crucial decisions which may affect the reputation of the force, the success of the missions and the safety of the peacekeeping troops, may have to be made without delay the detachment likely to face a difficult situation should never be without an officer.²⁰

The Nordic countries do not use career Noncommissioned Officers (NCOs) on peacekeeping duty. The enlisted ranks are composed of conscripts who volunteer to extend their required time to participate on a specific United Nations mission, and reserve NCOs who sign a contract for a specific position on a specific United Nations mission. Because of the limited experience base of their NCOs the Nordics rely on officers to make decisions. Because of this lack of professional NCOs, the Nordics must issue very detailed rules Of Engagement (ROE). ROE must be uniform throughout the mission. This enables all soldiers to understand the ROE and to execute them the same way.²¹

Perhaps the most important guidelines given to Nordic peacekeepers are concerning the use of force. There are two categories of this guidance, use of force for self-defense and use of force to control situations.

Peacekeepers can use force for self-defense if attacked. It can also be used to prevent attempts to disarm peacekeepers by a party. The use of force must be calculated. Where possible, the use of force should be avoided through shows of force or negotiation.²²

Beyond the use of force for self-defense, the main guideline is to use the minimum amount of force necessary to achieve the desired result. There are three categories for using force. Negotiation with a clear indication that the peacekeepers may potentially use force is the first stage in considering the use of force. Next, a show of force displaying the peacekeepers' resolve can be used. Finally, peacekeepers may compel a party by the use of force. This is a sliding scale. First peacekeepers negotiate and imply the capability to use force. If this is unsuccessful, the peace keeper uses a show of force followed by negotiation. If still unsuccessful, the peacekeepers deploy and prepare to take action and try one last chance at negotiation. Finally, if still unsuccessful, peacekeepers may use force to compel a party.²³

This second doctrinal discussion on the use of force is not effective unless the United Nations has the capability to compel a party. If a party knows that the United Nations lacks the resources, the mandate or the resolve to compel them, the party can stand up to the peacekeepers. The lack of adequate resources, or the lack of an appropriate mandate or the faltering resolve within the Security Council can spell disaster for peacekeeping operations. These are among the problems currently facing United Nations peacekeeping forces.

Peacekeeping underwent a change from the Nordic model to peacekeeping as it is occurring today.

Nordic doctrine, often termed traditional peacekeeping, is limited to those situations where there was consent of the parties involved. During the Cold War, this doctrine was adequate. However, the inadequacy of this doctrine became apparent as peacekeepers were deployed into situations which lacked the consent of all the parties. An accurate perspective of the use of the military for traditional peacekeeping is described below.

Throughout the Cold War, the United Nations aided in conflict avoidance and resolution by consensual peacekeeping. That is the introduction of a neutral force or observers between belligerents, with their consent, to supervise a cease-fire and facilitate a negotiated settlement of their differences. With varying degrees, this has worked in many parts of the world. Its chief effect is to assure both sides that the other is not cheating on a truce.²⁴

The narrow scope of traditional peacekeeping, and the mission of the United Nations in general, changed in the 1980's. Michael Renner wrote:

The traditional peacekeeping model is based on the principles of impartiality, nonviolence, consent of all parties, and no deployment without an established cease-fire. It is workable in cases where the U.N. is called upon by the warring parties themselves to police a cease-fire. But it appears unworkable in the two types of situations that the U.N. is increasingly getting involved in: Those in which it is invited to facilitate a demilitarization but the combatants fail to comply with the terms they earlier agreed to; and those in which it intervenes against the express wishes of one or more of the contenders, for humanitarian purposes.²⁵

Prior to 1985 all United Nations peacekeeping operations were conducted after the fact. That is the crisis had begun and peacekeepers were deployed only after the violent phase of the crisis had passed. Mostly, peacekeeping was truce supervision or treaty observation. Rarely did the super powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, directly participate in peacekeeping. Peacekeeping filled a niche in

the balance of power.²⁶ All the peacekeeping operations prior to 1985 were mounted after the crisis had developed and peacekeepers were deployed in accordance with model described by Dag Hammarskjöld.

The thirteen operations mounted from 1985 until 1992 went beyond monitoring and supervision. It is the most recent operations; Cambodia, Yugoslavia and Somalia, that have caused the greatest challenges to peacekeepers and the United Nations. As US Assistant Secretary of State Bennet stated:

In recent years the United Nations system has moved towards center stage of world events. Political borders have been overwhelmed by economic, technological, environmental, demographic and criminal forces. Cooperative action is now indispensable in a host of areas relevant to daily lives of our citizens. So, it is our responsibility to see that international institutions and arrangements succeed.²⁷

This cooperative action is designed to meet the challenges of the future. The following chapters will discuss how the United Nations, Great Britain and the United States have planned to meet these challenges.

CHAPTER 3

AN AGENDA FOR PEACE

"At no time since its inception has the nature or concept of peacekeeping been as open to redefinition as it is at this time."¹ Kofi Annan, the Under Secretary General for peacekeeping Operations, wrote these words to describe the dynamic changes in peacekeeping. The best description of the changing nature of peace operations was written by Annan's superior, United Nations Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, in his An Agenda for Peace. Boutros-Ghali's work was designed to set a course for the future use of peacekeepers.

He (Boutros-Ghali) expressed the hope that the end of the Cold War might present an opportunity for the United Nations to create a more peaceful world, as originally envisioned by the United Nations Charter. He anticipated an expanded role beyond traditional, consensual peacekeeping, to a type of activity that has since become known as 'peace enforcement.'²

In this work, the Secretary General divides peace operations into four categories: peacemaking, peace-keeping, preventive diplomacy and peace building.³ Boutros-Ghali is clearly impressed with the potential of the United Nations to resolve conflicts. He underestimates the value States put on sovereignty and overestimates the tools of diplomacy and the ability of the United Nations to resolve conflicts. He does, however, offer a great insight into the role of peace operations in the arsenal of diplomacy. Boutros-Ghali is also very important in the discussion of peace operations since many world leaders, and United States leaders, concur with his perceptions of

conflict resolution in the new world order. An Agenda for Peace, is one of the classic attempts to come to grips with peace operations' dramatic changes in the 1990s. It had a tremendous impact on peace operations doctrine world wide.

By looking at Boutros-Ghali's work we can see the foundation for the current United States' military peace operations doctrine. Though the US Army does not take his work as verbatim, it supports many of his assertions on possible uses of the military to assist diplomatic ends. We do not, however, necessarily accept that the United Nations is always the appropriate body for military action in support of diplomacy. We, the United States, may act unilaterally, with a coalition or under the United Nations depending upon the United States national objectives. Thus caveated, we can gain a great insight into our current doctrine by looking in detail at Boutros-Ghali's Agenda for Peace.

Boutros Boutros-Ghali defines preventive diplomacy as action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, action to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts, and action to limit the spread of the latter when they do occur.⁴

Within preventive diplomacy there are five components: measures to build confidence, fact finding, early warning, and demilitarized zones. Boutros-Ghali contends that preventive diplomacy is:

"the most desirable and efficient (way) . . . to ease tensions before they result in conflict-or, if conflict breaks out, to act swiftly to contain it and resolve its underlying causes."⁵

Measures to build confidence are the means to establish mutual confidence and good faith between states. Examples of these measures are: the systematic exchange of military missions, establishment of

regional risk reduction centers, and arrangements for the free flow of information to monitor regional arms agreements.⁶

Fact finding establishes information needed for diplomats to make decisions. "Preventive steps must be based upon timely and accurate knowledge of the facts."⁷ That is, before the Secretary General can act, he needs information about economic, social and political developments and trends. But, in order to get this information the Secretary General must first request permission from the state to which he wants to send the fact finders; or the state must volunteer the information so he can act. The reluctance of states to allow the United Nations to violate their sovereignty, limits this as a tool for preventive diplomacy.

Early warning is an aspect of preventive diplomacy closely related to fact finding. Boutros-Ghali includes as subjects of information that the United Nations can obtain, the areas of environmental threats, the risk of nuclear accident, natural disasters, mass movements of populations, the threat of famine, and the spread of disease. The United Nations system to gather this information, however, needs improvement.⁸ It is noteworthy that the United States Army has been called upon to conduct operations to resolve problems in some of the above mentioned areas, and these issues are now part of the current United States National Military Strategy.⁹ 1994 was the first year that Peace Operations were explicitly identified in the US National Security Strategy as a major tool to prevent and contain or resolve conflicts.¹⁰

One area of preventive diplomacy where the United States is greatly involved is early warning. Historically, the United Nations deployed forces to the crisis area after the conflict has occurred. An

early warning deployment is at the request of a host government (or the parties to the conflict), when the presence of the United Nations can discourage hostilities or reassure a government. An early warning deployment can control violence, alleviate suffering, distribute humanitarian assistance, develop conditions for negotiations, and safeguard populations. The United States Army is deeply involved in an early warning as part of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, FYROM. Under the title of Operation Able Sentry, the United States Army has an infantry battalion (minus two companies) positioned along the border with Yugoslavia to observe and report on developments that would indicate a spread of the violence that has engulfed the former Yugoslavia. The deployment of the United Nations was at the request of the government of Macedonia and has been successful to this point in discouraging the spread of hostilities.

The last element of preventive diplomacy is the use of demilitarized zones. The purpose of a demilitarized zone is to separate potential belligerents and to remove the pretext for attacks.¹¹

Beyond preventive diplomacy is peacemaking. According to Boutros-Ghali, peacemaking is "action to bring hostile parties to agreement, essentially through such peaceful means as those foreseen in Chapter IV of the Charter of the United Nations."¹² The tools he specifically discusses are: use of the World Court to resolve disputes, amelioration of crises through assistance, sanctions, and the use of military force.¹³

Boutros-Ghali maintains that the World Court is not utilized enough to resolve differences.¹⁴ But what he fails to consider is the reason the World Court is not utilized is the reluctance of nations to accept the World Court's jurisdiction and the absence of an entity that

will enforce the World Courts decisions. If the verdict of the World Court is unfavorable a nation can claim that the World Court's decisions are solely advisory and not binding. Boutros-Ghali makes many recommendations on strengthening the court, but it is reasonable that the court will not become more effective without some means to implement its decisions.

One means of peacemaking is to get states to agree to the findings of the World Court, and other United Nations bodies. Peacemaking is through the use of sanctions and other special economic measures. The United Nations can impose sanctions to encourage states to cooperate with the decisions of the United Nations.¹⁵ The use of sanctions is not a quick solution to resolve problems. For example sanctions were first imposed on South Africa in the 1970s, but the white minority did not relinquish power until 1994. Further, many observers believe that sanctions were only one of several factors that led to the end of white minority rule. Another example of sanctions is those sanctions imposed on Iraq to force compliance with the United Nations resolutions involving the inspection of weapons programs. The sanctions on Iraq have caused great difficulties for neighbor States whose economies were tied to that of Iraq, and have served to further impoverish the the Iraqi masses. Sanctions have not brought the regime to compliance. Sanctions will not be viewed as a deterrent to ignoring the United Nations as long as those in power in the state to be coerced believe they can outlast the resolve of the United Nations. Coalitions are hard to maintain. The current, dynamic international political situation makes it not unreasonable for leaders of a renegade state to see sanctions as a nuisance. They would believe that sanctions can be overcome if they can gather sufficient international support to have them lifted. States might also try to persevere until the United

Nations grows tired. Fortunately for South Africa's black majority, the United Nations was able to maintain the sanctions.

The converse of sanctions is amelioration through assistance. In theory, amelioration through assistance entails the United Nations offering resources to solve root cause problems.¹⁶ Once the root cause problem has been addressed the premise for hostilities will be mitigated. Peace building is the coordination of the comprehensive efforts to identify and support structures that will tend to consolidate peace and advance a sense of confidence and well being among people.¹⁷ Simply put, peace building is actions taken to prevent a reoccurrence of the crisis.

Some of the missions of peace building are: disarming warring parties, restoration of order, taking custody and the destruction of weapons, repatriation of refugees, training security personnel, monitoring elections, advancing efforts to protect human rights, reforming political institutions, and encouraging participation in the political process.¹⁸

It is Boutros-Ghali's, and the United Nation's, definitions that provide the basis for most militaries' definitions for peacemaking, peace enforcement, and peacekeeping. The concepts of the level of consent to the deployment, presence or absence of hostilities, and the use of force by the outside military force, are the yardstick most nations use in determining if a peace operation is peacekeeping, peace enforcement or peacemaking.

In an article published in Orbis entitled "An Agenda for Peace: One Year Later," Boutros-Ghali reaffirmed his belief in the potential for peace operations to play a leading role in diplomacy and conflict resolution. He restated that preventive diplomacy seeks to resolve

disputes before violence breaks out and that peacemaking and peacekeeping are required to halt conflicts and preserve peace once peace is achieved. He maintained that preventive diplomacy is designed to prevent crisis and that peace building is designed to prevent a reoccurrence. However, the events of 1992 had sobered him to some realities, the harshest of which was the limitations of United Nations peace operations.¹⁹

According to Boutros-Ghali, the authority for the United Nations authorizing the use of military force is Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. "It is the essence of the concept of collective security as contained in the Charter that if peaceful means fail, the measures provided in Chapter VII should be used . . . to maintain or restore international peace and security."²⁰ Here the United Nations, as a last resort, can compel a state to conform to a decision. This has never been done, according to Boutros-Ghali. In the liberation of Kuwait the United Nations gave member states authority to undertake military operations on the United Nations' behalf.

Boutros-Ghali differentiates between two articles of the United Nations Charter which authorize the use of military forces. Article 42 grants the Security Council the authority "to take military action or restore international peace and security."²¹ Boutros-Ghali amends this by adding the limitation that force should only be used when all peaceful means have failed, and adds that the use of force is "essential to the credibility of the United Nations as a guarantor of international security."²²

Boutros-Ghali uses the second element, the use of military force by the United Nations is essential to guarantee international security, to attempt to raise a standing United Nations military force

for peace enforcement. Boutros-Ghali would utilize the forces as a rapid reaction force and would be more heavily armed than peacekeepers and would have extensive training by contributing States. Kofi Annan, as cited during the discussion on integration in Chapter Two , offered that regional bodies, like NATO, are well suited to conduct operations under a mandate from the United Nations.²³ Given the lack of resources in the United Nations to command and control forces in the field, Annan's idea of using standing regional alliances to implement mandates may have more appeal to member states. Regional alliances will have a vested interest in stability in the area and they offer a more cost effective alternative to the United Nations maintaining standing forces. Additionally, standing alliances, like NATO, should be more capable of commanding and controlling forces since member states to the alliance should have consented to the alliance procedures.

While Annan understands the changes in peace operations, he fails to appreciate the magnitude of that change. The following summarizes the nature of peace operations. He wrote:

Of the 27 Operations mounted within the last 45 years - and the 13 still running - nine have taken shape within the last two years alone. As the number of operations increases, our perception of the essence of peacekeeping changes from what it was during the first four decades of the the United Nations' growth . . .Through improvisation over time peacekeeping has been used to investigate and report on volatile situations, to monitor truces and cease fires, to verify compliance with agreements, to establish buffer zones between hostile armies, to help create the conditions necessary for the implementation of complex settlements and to provide humanitarian support to local populations caught up in war . . .Peacekeeping as we have come to know it is neither defined nor proscribed in the Charter itself; the only reference there to United Nations activities involving military force is in Chapter Seven, which has rarely been invoked in peacekeeping. Instead, peacekeeping is a tool that has largely been used in situations where application of Chapter Six of the Charter was not adequate and utilization of Chapter Seven was not possible. Peacekeeping thus became in Dag Hammarskjöld's memorable phrase, "Chapter Six and a half." . . . The only way to define peacekeeping as it has been practiced is to take a cross section of the characteristics of

Operations pursued to date. In this context, peacekeeping appears as "the use of multinational military personnel, armed or unarmed under international command and with the consent of the parties to help control and resolve conflict between hostile states and between hostile communities within a state." Clear as that definition seems, events are now rendering parts of it contentious.²⁴

Historically the United Nations used preventive diplomacy (Chapter Six) to try and resolve crises, When these methods proved inadequate, the solution used by the United Nations was peacekeeping as Hammarskjöld described, Chapter Six and a Half. Now, peace operations can be conducted under the auspices of Chapter Seven as envisioned by Boutros-Ghali. However, Annan does not differentiate between the various manifestations of peace operations.

Boutros-Ghali indicates that there is a difference between peacekeeping and peace enforcing. Peace enforcement is the use of military force as a component of peacemaking. Peacekeeping is:

"the deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned, involving the United Nations military and police forces . . . it is a technique that expands the possibility for both the prevention of conflict and the making of peace."²⁵

This definition is very similar to the definition used by the International Peace Academy, the Nordics and the United States.

The open and violently manifested disdain that the combatants in former Yugoslavia showed to United Nation troops in Bosnia who were escorting humanitarian aid, and the inability of United Nations to comprehensively resolve the integral discord and humanitarian disaster in Somalia, all served to temper his expectations for the Blue Berets, but not his ambitions. Boutros-Ghali wrote:

Peacemaking is the task of bring hostile parties to agreement by peaceful means . . . Humanitarian assistance as a contribution to peacemaking is required in an increasing array of situations. On the one hand humanitarian emergencies may constitute threats to international peace and security or aggravate existing threats. On the other hand disturbances of the peace may give rise to

humanitarian crises. No peacemaking effort can be effective unless major related humanitarian crises are dealt with as part of the package . . . Peacekeeping must be comprehensive. It must deal with virtually every aspect of human affairs.²⁶

From this passage one can discern Boutros-Ghali's blurring of the differences between peacekeeping and peacemaking. Here, peacekeeping has gone from having a decidedly military flavor to being multi-disciplined, that is the inclusion of peacemaking. These operations, traditional peacekeeping and multi disciplined peacemaking, are different especially where peacemaking requires humanitarian aid to be distributed.

Militarily, a humanitarian support force is a much more sophisticated operation to mount and command than a traditional peace force. Peacekeeping forces are normally static garrisons; by comparison, a relief escort column is an operation of war. It requires a continuous series of mobile deployments, hour-by hour direction and support, and a high degree of professional expertise at command and troop level.²⁷

"Peacekeeping today involves a new concept, expanded peacekeeping."²⁸ Boutros-Ghali, in his ambitious attempt to use the United Nations to resolve international crises, recognized that he must expand his concept of peacekeeping to keep pace with the changing world. The changing world is one where the presence of the Blue Beret no longer guarantees respect by the parties concerned.

Protecting the flow of relief supplies, early warnings and sanctions on commerce and communications are only part of what may be involved in the future. Beyond these measures, when established rules of engagement are not longer sufficient, United Nations forces may need authorization to use force. Mandates must match realities on the ground.²⁹

It seems that there exists, if no where else but in the minds of the United Nations leadership and diplomats, an ability by peacekeepers to be able to conduct a myriad of missions in varying conditions of hostility simultaneously.

Boutros-Ghali has blurred the differences between peacekeeping, peace enforcement, peace building, and peacemaking. This is far afield from how the United Nations first viewed peacekeeping, and ignores the limitations United Nations forces, or any forces, must overcome in order to adjust to elusive mandates. It is this blurring that is well examined in British doctrine, and in United States doctrine. Donald Snow wrote:

The Secretary General, as well as some discussants in the United States, fail to distinguish adequately between peacekeeping and peace-enforcement. Peacekeeping, a role the U.N. has played over the years, is relatively straightforward and, despite its difficulties, comparatively easy. Peacekeeping involves monitoring and enforcing a cease-fire agreed to by two or more former combatants. It proceeds in an atmosphere where peace exists and where the former combatants minimally prefer peace to continued war. Peace-enforcement, as it is used by the Joint Staff, entails the physical interposition of armed forces to separate ongoing combatants to create a cease-fire that does not exist. Boutros-Ghali on the other hand, uses the term to refer to actions to keep a cease-fire from being violated or to reinstate a failed cease-fire. It is a subtle difference, but it does imply the existence of some will for peace. The American version more realistically portrays another, far more difficult matter. By definition, in a situation for which peace-enforcement is a potentially appropriate response, war and not peace describes the situation and one or more of the combatants prefers it that way. This means that, unlike peacekeepers, peace enforcers are often not welcomed by one or either sides. Rather, they are active fighters who must impose a cease-fire that is opposed by one or both combatants; in the process, the neutrality that distinguishes peacekeepers will most likely be lost.³⁰

By failing to understand the difference between the requirements for peacekeeping and peace enforcement, it is possible for what is termed Mission Creep to occur. Mission Creep occurs when a force is deployed for one mission and the mission changes during the course of the deployment. Given the lack of understanding of the very different nature of peacekeeping and peace enforcement, the risks of mission creep to peace enforcement are very great.

Forces are deployed with a mandate and, hopefully, the resources to fulfill that mandate. To change a force's initial mandate, as was done in Somalia, likely will require reconstitution of the force, or deployment of a supplementary force to insure there are sufficient resources to meet the change. While it may seem simple for the leadership at the United Nations Headquarters in New York, or inside the Washington Beltway, to make changes in a mandate, it is quite another issue to adapt soldiers who will need to be trained and equipped, and to inform the local populations.

The blurring of missions between the various forms of peace operations can be understood with the uncertainties in the world today. As Donald Snow observed:

The danger is in thinking peacekeeping forces can be inserted into peace-enforcement situations; that somehow the situations represent a lineal extension of one another. Peace-enforcement requires, as argued, very different forces qualitatively and quantitatively than does peacekeeping. The result of confusing roles and forces has been most evident in the placing of UNPROFOR peacekeepers in a war zone in Sarajevo, where the peacekeepers were placed in a peace-enforcement situation and have proven-unsurprisingly-not to be up to a task for which they are unprepared.³¹

Despite Boutros-Ghali's ambitions for peacekeepers to conduct all manners of peace operations, there is in the history and doctrine of the United Nations an established and simple role for peacekeepers. This traditional role for peacekeepers does not meet all the challenges of peace operations.

As discussed earlier, there is a difference between peacekeeping and peace enforcement. The best example of the consequences of this difference is the United States' Operations in Somalia.

Although the United Nations was deployed in Somalia, United Nations Somalia Operation (UNISOM I), the United States under President

Bush deployed forces to end the massive human catastrophe of starvation. This unilateral action does not fit all of the criteria set by Hammarskjöld for a Chapter Six and a Half operation, but does meet the three main criteria: consent, impartiality and Rules of Engagement (ROE) that limited the use of force.

There was no existing legitimate government in Somalia at the time of the US troops arrival to grant consent for the deployment. However, many factions welcomed the introduction of United States troops to end the starvation. The United Nations was pleased by the United States' action, but the United Nations did not control the US operation. (The United Nations already had a force in Somalia which had been under attack prior to US forces being attacked.) The United States, at first, had widespread support, freedom of movement, was impartial and did not need to use force except for self-defense.

Later, the operation became more complicated. The mission changed from stopping starvation to trying to disarm factions, and force peace on the Somali clans. Because this new mission seemed to favor the interests of only some clans, the United States was no longer viewed as impartial. The clans who were the object of the United States' now partisan efforts withdrew their consent for the United States's forces. The United States forces were no longer perceived to be impartial and thereby lost their unhindered freedom of movement. They were forced to engage in combat operations, took casualties, and support for the operation in the United States waned.

What had been a Chapter Six and a half operation became a Chapter Seven operation. This is an example of mission creep. As a Chapter Seven operation it was not sustained by the United States. A Chapter Seven operation is inherently dangerous and forces are not in a benign environment. Mister Annan is remiss in his use of peacekeeping

when he is really referring to peace enforcement, especially in the case of Somalia.

By allowing an opening for peacekeepers to lose their impartiality, the very nature of the operation changes. By not limiting the use of force to only self-defense, the types of forces, their resources and their mandates, are very different. Failure to differentiate between peacekeeping and peace enforcement can have great consequences as seen in Somalia. Unfortunately, Annan, in adding his voice in support of the United Nations conducting peace enforcement, tries to hide this new manifestation of peace operations. He paints peace enforcement as a natural and somewhat simple progression from the old Hammarskjöld criteria. While Annan recognizes that peace operations have changed with the potential for Chapter Seven Operations, he fails to see that peacekeeping and peace enforcement are very different.

There is now increasing support for 'peacekeeping with teeth.' As lightly armed peacekeepers are made to look helpless in Somalia and Bosnia, member States and public opinion increasingly support more muscular action, a greater number of situations seem to require it and the United Nations Charter affords the legal cover for it. Formerly a tradition had developed by which Operations required the consent of the parties involved. In the current conflicts, how should we define a party Does each faction in the former Yugoslavia qualify? Does every tribe in Somalia? . . . the idea of peacekeeping was always subject to the principle of minimum use of force and was represented by contingents and equipment that made more extensive measures impractical. Peacekeepers were deployed to keep peace, not make war; their major weapon was moral authority, not military strength. Today's conflicts in Somalia and Bosnia have fundamentally rearranged the parameters of Peace-Keeping. It is no longer enough to implement agreements or separate antagonists; the international community now wants peacekeepers to demarcate boundaries, control and eliminate heavy weapons, quell anarchy and guarantee the delivery of humanitarian aid in war zones. These are clearly tasks that call for 'teeth and muscle' in addition to the less tangible qualities that we have sought in the past.³²

Annan has articulated the desires of the international community for an orderly world. Unfortunately, he has also overstated

what falls into the realm of peacekeeping. Thereby, he has failed to recognize the differences between peacekeeping and peace enforcement. Nor does Annan comprehend what Chapter Seven operations entail and how this intervention, especially under United Nations auspices, will be supported.

John Mackinlay wrote that intervention is an enterprise that entails great risk. This risk will likely limit the enthusiasm of member states to support intervention to situations which have been well evaluated.

Military intervention by a foreign power or international force is a grave and dangerous undertaking. History is not on the side of the intervener. The consequences of failure may be much wider than the local dispute it seeks to resolve. The moral passion that drives the international community to intervene is only creative if the intervention can succeed, and its success will rely on cold logic and careful planning, not passion. As things stand there seem to be many reasons why such a force cannot be successfully deployed.³³

Some, especially in the United States, have a reluctance to place troops under United Nations Command, this reluctance is compensated for in US doctrine. US Army doctrine, as contained in FM 100-23, allows for US participation as the leader of coalitions, unilateral action and forces in support to a coalition. The US maintains the capability to act unilaterally when necessary, but may act as part of a coalition if not as the leader, then in support.

The clear preference among US military planners is for the US to provide "enabling" support (such as logistics, communications, and transportation) while the actual peace operations are carried out by other national contingents.³⁴

So, the United Nations understands that there is a continuum of military support to peace operations. The United Nations recognizes peacemaking as Operations under Chapter Six of the Charter as being mainly diplomatic in scope with limited military involvement. When diplomacy fails, the United Nations will utilize what Hammarskjöld

called Chapter Six and a Half peacekeeping in a benign environment. The problem arises in the current desire for Chapter Seven operations. These Chapter Seven operations are erroneously referred to by Boutros-Ghali and Annan as another form of peacekeeping in an attempt to explain the ineffectiveness of several United Nations missions. These missions, specifically Bosnia and Somalia, are in fact peace enforcement Operations. Peace enforcement operations are significantly different from peacekeeping, and failure to recognize the difference, as in Somalia, can have deadly consequences. The mission of peace enforcement is very different from peacekeeping. The resources needed for the missions are different, as Boutros-Ghali and Annan fail to completely appreciate.

What is different, and what is the true measure of the difference between peace enforcement and peacekeeping is the lack of a tendency of states, and parties, to support a peace enforcement mission. Peace enforcement as Boutros-Ghali and Annan see it is simply a slide up the scale of United Nations from peacekeeping. However, the risk to soldiers in forcing warring factions to submit to the demands of the United Nations is not just a change in mandate. The change from peacekeeping to peace enforcement is a fundamental change from neutral observer to partial combatant.

CHAPTER 4

BRITISH WIDER PEACEKEEPING

Just as Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali and Undersecretary General Kofi Annan desire to use the military more frequently and for different purposes, many Nations also desire their militaries to take on increasing missions. One nation who has a history of success both in war and in the use of the military in missions that are not war is Great Britain. The British have taken on the responsibility to develop doctrine and training to prepare forces for these new missions. British doctrine is closely tied to the writings of Boutros-Ghali and to current US doctrine.

This chapter explains British doctrine, offers alternatives for the British wider peacekeeping model, discusses the British peace operations principles and looks at how the British train their peacekeepers.

The British have a simple yet accurate picture of the range of these new missions. The British see peace operations falling into one of three general categories: peacekeeping, wider peacekeeping and peace enforcement. There are five tasks: conflict prevention, demobilization, military assistance and humanitarian relief. In order for British troops to be prepared to meet these challenges, they must be trained with special skills based upon soldier discipline and a firm foundation in military subjects.

The British use the term wider peacekeeping to describe "the wider aspects of peacekeeping that, for the British Army, have become more prominent in the post Cold War."¹ In an effort to develop doctrine to

address an area of increasing responsibility for the British, they have used some United Nations terms to describe peace operations. They have not, however, limited themselves to United Nations terminology. One example is their development of the term wider peacekeeping.

Wider peacekeeping operations represent a dynamic area of doctrinal development and there is as yet no unanimous international agreement on the definitions of terms or categories of activity. The term wider peacekeeping is original and the scope of its associated operations broad . . . Notwithstanding the relatively fresh context of such activities, the kinds of operation covered are not new to the British Army. In the latter half of this century our Army amassed a wealth of of unique experience in counter-insurgency, counter-terrorist and peacekeeping operations, maintaining a remarkably successful record.²

The British recognize that there are, as yet, no internationally accepted terms to describe the number of uses of the military outside those of conventional warfare. They have made a valuable contribution to understanding the nature of the new missions by developing three categories of operations.

The first of these three operations the British define as peacekeeping. Peace keeping operations are those operations carried out with the consent of the belligerent parties in support of efforts to achieve or maintain peace in order to promote security and sustain life in areas of potential or actual conflict. Wider peacekeeping is the broader aspect of peacekeeping operations carried out with the consent of the belligerent parties but in an environment that may be highly violent. Peace enforcement operations are carried out to restore peace between belligerents who do not all consent to intervention and who may be engaged in combat activities.³


It would be a mistake to believe that these three missions form a natural progression from peacekeeping to wider peacekeeping to peace enforcement. That is, peacekeeping is not a basic form of operation

that if the situation deteriorates the mission becomes wider peacekeeping and then can further degrade to peace enforcement. Nor does the British model infer that the three missions are completely distinct with no relationship between them. Rather, one must take the missions as distinct in terms of the mission requirements, but related in that the missions are defined in relation to the principles of consent, use of force, and impartiality. This means that the three missions are related in that they are not war in the conventional sense. But they are different from one another in the presence or absence of the consent of the warring factions to outside intervention, the authority of the intervening forces to use force beyond self-defense and the ability of the intervening forces to remain impartial.

The British believe that it is not correct to consider wider peacekeeping as a bridge between peacekeeping and peace enforcement. Rather, wider peacekeeping is more closely related to traditional peacekeeping of the Nordic model. It, like peacekeeping, requires the consent of the warring factions, does not normally allow the use of force for anything other than self protection, and implies that the intervening force would be impartial.

The British maintain that recognizing that missions exist on either side of the consent divide is significant. They believe that the way in which forces train, are equipped, and operate will not change significantly from peacekeeping to wider peacekeeping. However, the training, equipment and operations of forces that are conducting peace enforcement is very different.


One way to depict the relationship between these entities is with the model shown in figure 2.⁴ In figure 2 the three categories of missions are arrayed linearly. That is, there is a progression of missions from peacekeeping, as the Nordics knew it, to these new



missions in the middle ground (wider peacekeeping) to peace enforcement. The British reject this model because there is a significant difference between those missions that are in the middle ground and peace enforcement.

The British prefer the following model (figure 3) to show "The wider aspects of peacekeeping . . . surround the core peacekeeping category."⁵ In this model, traditional peacekeeping operations exist within a circle that is a subset of the more broad category of wider peacekeeping. The two missions exist on the same side of the consent divide due to the similarities the two functions would have in training, equipment and operations. Across the consent divide are peace enforcement missions. These missions, such as the enforcement of sanctions or direct intervention, lie beyond the consent divide.

By recognizing this critical divide, the British can avoid missions creeping from peacekeeping/wider peacekeeping to peace enforcement.



Because the environment on the left of the consent divide is most likely benign, the forces will be lightly equipped and will use force only for self-defense. If these lightly armed troops are taken across by a mission creep, or pulled across by warring factions, the forces would be at risk if they are not adequately trained, armed or supported for this new operation. Forces deployed for peace enforcement are likely to be better prepared for the hostilities that could come with the loss of consent of a warring faction since "the substance of its (peace enforcement's) military activity is likely to differ little from conventional war-fighting. Force levels and structures deployed for peacekeeping (including wider peacekeeping) are unlikely to be appropriate for peace enforcement."⁶

The environment where wider peacekeeping will take place may be characterized by numerous parties to the conflict, undisciplined factions, ineffective cease-fires, little law and order, violations of human rights, armed opposition to the United Nations, the presence of large bodies of both government and non government organizations, wrecked civil infrastructure, displaced persons and an ill defined area of operations. Within this environment, the intensity of conflict may vary from day-to-day or time-to-time in both scope and intensity. Wider peacekeeping units will have to face this environment. This will require preparation to conduct a number of varied tasks.


The British do not believe that the new category of operations, termed wider peacekeeping, is a new development or a separate category of operations from traditional peacekeeping. Yet wider peacekeeping is very separate from peace enforcement. The defining criteria is not violence or the lack of it. It is consent. It would be convenient to say that the difference between peacekeeping and both peace enforcement and war, is that in peacekeeping the level of violence is less.

However, if a peacekeeping force loses the consent of one or all of the parties, the entire nature of the mission changes. Force may have to be used for more than self-defense and peacekeepers will likely have to cross the divide of impartiality. The British argue:

Pragmatism and history thus seem to place wider peacekeeping tasks firmly within the peacekeeping category - a category where the preservation of consent is a principal guide of operational activity. To place them (wider peacekeeping tasks) in some fresh category appears not only specious historically, but misleading doctrinally since it would imply that such things as popular support, the conduct of negotiation, mediation and conciliation and the building of confidence and cooperation mattered less post Cold War and that peacekeeping principles might be safely abandoned in favour of a doctrine more orientated towards war fighting which took little or no account of the need to preserve consent. Such an approach would offer little chance of practical success.⁷

So for the British, the new range of missions spawned after the Cold War are across the consent divide from war fighting and peace enforcement. These new missions are closely connected to traditional peacekeeping with the requirement for consent. However, consent is not necessary at all times in all places. In fact, the British contend, there is likely to be local instances where consent fails. This failure could be attributable to poor central control of the faction, or dissension within the faction, or a local incident. An example of a local incident might be if a peacekeeping soldier befriends a local person of one faction and another faction considers this to render local peacekeepers partial. What could ensue would be local violence that the British would term a tactical breakdown of consent. This local breakdown does not necessarily mean that consent has failed at the operational level.⁸

Therefore, we can adjust our earlier model to have a wavy line on the portion of the model nearest to wider peacekeeping. This signifies the loss of tactical consent in some areas. Meanwhile, the portion of



consent that is nearest to peace enforcement is still straight. This indicates that the mission might still have operational level consent, that is consent by, perhaps, the majority of the factions or the faction leadership. The modified model is depicted by figure 4.

However, with the wavy line we have local instances of the loss of consent. One might have a hard time convincing the peacekeeper on the ground that consent continues, if he is fired upon. But, at the higher level, the doctrine of wider peacekeeping is willing to suffer a certain amount of local violence before the loss of consent thrusts the mission into the realm of peace enforcement.


The commander of the first US task force deployed to the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO), Col Wolf D. Kutter, offered a variation to the British model. He noted that there is a range of peacekeeping operations that fall into a continuum. This continuum has observer missions at one extreme and enforcement missions at the other. He also noted that there is a middle ground of missions that he termed presence.

Peace keeping presence, the center of the scale, represents the noncoercive nature of military units participating in such

operations (peacekeeping). These may be company to brigade level forces with guarantee, interposition, or buffer missions. Their mission is achieved through impartial presence, precise information flow to all parties, tact and diplomacy, and use of force purely as a last resort in self-defense.⁹

Thus, Kutter provided the following model, figure 5. The top arrow shows the continuum of missions. The second arrow shows the missions exist simultaneously with the requirement for the force to maintain third party impartiality or neutrality. In Kutter's model, the decisive factor is neutrality. This neutrality can be eclipsed prior to the mission being transformed into a peace enforcement mission. But, like the British model, Kutter places peace enforcement across a divide from other peace operations.

Another attempt to identify the range of missions between



peacekeeping and peace enforcement is Col Larry Forster's term "coercive peacekeeping." "Coercive peacekeeping" is:

A variation of peacekeeping which carefully uses coercion, or the threat of force, to insure compliance with the terms of a truce, as initially agreed upon by all major belligerent parties, in ways broadly acceptable to the international community.¹⁰

Coercive peacekeeping requires a peacekeeping force, but its mandate would include an agreement from the parties to allow it to use force to achieve an agreement. Forster admits that this type of operation would have very narrow uses. It could be used to protect humanitarian relief and to deter truce breakers.¹¹

One clear way to lose neutrality, and consent of the parties, is by the use of force.

F.T. Liu wrote:

There is also a correlation between the principle of non use of force except in self-defense and that of impartiality, Military personnel must not take sides in the conflict that they are sent to contain. They must maintain friendly relations with both sides and act with complete impartiality. If the peacekeepers were to use force against one of the parties concerned, they would cease to be impartial and would become part of the problem and not its solution.¹²

Parties to a conflict would likely view peacekeepers who have used force for more than self defense as being partisan.

The use of force by peacekeepers can transform peacekeeping into peace enforcement. Sir Alan Munro wrote:

Where suffering is the consequence of conflict, a military presence dedicated to keeping the peace and to the protection of relief operations can find itself all too often drawn into confrontation with one or more of the local warring factions. At this point its impartiality is called into question and its capacity for deterrence through its presence alone starts to lose credibility. Peace keeping starts to become transformed into peace enforcement, a role requiring the enhancement of military capability to a force level which the international community is today showing itself loathe to contemplate. Meanwhile, the humanitarian agencies find their operations prejudiced through their association with the very forces intended to facilitate their operations.

In other words the blue flag starts to be seen as a liability rather than an asset. Such was the case in Somalia, and it is being repeated today in parts of Bosnia.¹³

Sir Alan Munro's points out that the use of force by peacekeepers can transform the force into a party to the conflict, in fact, or in the perception of one of parties. This appearance of partisanship can endanger the efforts of other international operations. One agency which has outright rejected any use of force in the pursuit of its missions, and to maintain its neutrality, is the International Red Cross.

In an address to the NATO leadership on cooperation between the United Nations Protection Force, UNPROFOR, and the Red Cross, Thierry Germond highlighted how the Red Cross has succeeded in maintaining impartiality. He said:

Here we should underscore the fact that the Red Cross and Red Crescent personnel have only one means of protection: their emblem. If it is to be respected, the Red Cross or Red Crescent emblem must enjoy the confidence of all and must not be associated with the bearing of weapons . . . The ICRC, as an institution called upon to play the role of neutral intermediary in situations of armed conflict, must at all cost maintain complete independence vis-a-vis the parties to the conflict and other humanitarian agencies - including the United Nations - in order to safeguard its neutrality . . . The manner in which the ICRC's neutrality as an independent humanitarian organization is perceived by all the parties of the conflict has to be clearly distinguished from the neutrality of the United Nations, which may resort to the use of force in its effort to restore peace.¹⁴

The Red Cross is different from the United Nations since the United Nations will use force. This use of force can erode the neutrality of peacekeepers. With the loss of neutrality can come the loss of consent. The loss of consent then transforms the mission out of peacekeeping into peace enforcement.

The British recognize the importance of maintaining consent since consent is the defining feature of an operation being peacekeeping or peace enforcement. In British doctrine there are six principles in guarding consent. These are impartiality, minimum force, legitimacy, credibility, mutual respect, and transparency.

The first principle, impartiality, is probably the most significant. The British liken the the responsibility of peacekeepers to remain impartial to the role of a sports referee. The referee is outnumbered on the field and can not exert his authority by force. His status as a referee gives him the legitimacy to adjudicate matters. This legitimacy is derived from his impartiality. If he takes sides, then he loses his legitimacy and his authority. Then he would require an equal number of referees to the opposition to be able to make the game a contest. If he wants to control the game, he must either maintain his impartial legitimacy or have three referees for every member of the opposition. Since peacekeeping is an economy of force mission, it is more cost effective and simpler to rely on impartiality and legitimacy rather than on force, if the conditions allow it. If the conditions require overwhelming force to control the situation, then the mission is not wider peacekeeping. Rather, we have crossed the consent divide to peace enforcement since we no longer have legitimacy by our position and must enforce our authority. Once one is compelled to use force, it is not likely that the party being forced will consider the Peace Keepers to be impartial. The sense of partial treatment can be aggravated by the use of excessive force.

There are times when the boys in the Observation Posts are the Force Commander.¹⁵ This comment by General Cot, former commander of UNPROFOR referred to the decisions that Non Commissioned Officers and Junior Officers on peacekeeping duty must make, in a split second, without the luxury of consulting higher headquarters. Sometimes these decisions have exceptional impact on international diplomacy. An example of this would be if an Observation Patrol uncovers a hostile situation and is taken under fire. Rules of Engagement would normally allow for self-defense. But how much force is self-defense. If

returning fire is adequate to compel the aggressive party to stop shooting that should be the end of the skirmish and negotiations might be able to take place. But, under the pressure of being fired upon, a junior leader or inexperienced leader may over react and fire excessively. An over reaction could embitter the party fired upon, even if they initiated the fight and were caught doing something wrong. The junior leader has to make a mature decision. This decision is likely to be micro-analyzed from the safety of a headquarters by staff officers and diplomats with hours to evaluate what the junior leader had seconds to decide. When the situation is discussed in the safety of the headquarters, the Force Commander has to live with the decisions of his junior leaders. The concept of minimum use of force is critical because excessive force can provide the basis for one party to question the impartiality of the peacekeepers. By using force, peacekeepers can cross the consent line. This could be irrevocable

The British maintain that the judgments concerning the use of force are likely to be the most critical that a commander will make. The unrestricted use of force in a wider peacekeeping operation is likely to cross the consent divide faster than anything else. The misuse of force risks destabilizing peacekeeping operations and causing an uncontrolled and violent transition to peace enforcement.¹⁶

In addition to the principle of consent discussed above, the British have developed management principles for wider peacekeeping. The management principles are coherence, coordination and liaison, flexibility, security, concentration of force and freedom of movement. As will be discussed in Chapter Five, these management principles are quite close in spirit to American Operations Other Than War doctrine.

Coherence is the translation of the United Nations mandate into clearly defined and achievable tactical objectives. These objectives

then become the focus of the operation. Coordination and liaison is necessary in wider peacekeeping operations since these operations will likely include a wide range of entities not under the control of the Force Commander. These entities include civil powers, United Nations relief agencies and non governmental organizations like the International Red Cross.

Flexibility requires that wider peacekeeping units be able to perform a variety of missions at various levels of intensity. In order to do this units must have adequate self-defense capabilities and logistics.

Security is the next principle for examination. As stated earlier, self-defense is routinely authorized for United Nations peacekeepers, with the exception of UNMOs who are unarmed. Commanders have the responsibility to safeguard their units where possible, by not exposing their forces to undue risks. This requires balancing the mission with safety.

The principle of concentration of force is required to quickly provide sufficient forces to a crisis area to deter, provide credibility, or for domination of the local area.

Finally, freedom of movement is required for units to be able to effectively operate in the mission area. Denial of movement reduces the credibility of the force and must not be tolerated.

Having established the conceptual foundations of British wider peacekeeping doctrine, the next step is the description of the five mission categories of wider peacekeeping. The categories are conflict resolution, demobilization operations, military assistance, humanitarian relief, and guarantee and denial of movement.

The first category of wider peacekeeping operations is conflict prevention. Within conflict prevention there is early warning,

surveillance, stabilizing measures and preventive deployment.

The next category of wider peacekeeping operations is demobilization operations. "Demobilization operations are those actions taken by a wider peacekeeping force to restore and maintain a reasonable level of peace and personal security within a state or region."¹⁷

Military assistance is the next category of wider peacekeeping. "Military assistance refers to all forms of mandated assistance rendered by a wider peacekeeping force to a civil authority . . . In the absence of any effective government, military assistance may take the form of direct help given to civil communities."¹⁸ The British believe that the overall security situation must be stable and a broad consensual framework must exist. This, therefore, would exclude military support to a nation's counterinsurgency effort. Counterinsurgency operations are not wider peacekeeping. Though counter-insurgency is military support to civil authorities, it constitutes crossing the consent divide. Once one crosses the consent divide, as discussed earlier, the operation is no longer (wider) peacekeeping, but is now peace enforcement.

Humanitarian operations may be carried out in conjunction with other peacekeeping functions or independently. Humanitarian operations will require coordination with numerous aid agencies. These agencies could have different objectives or focuses from the peacekeepers, and in order to prevent redundant effort, coordination is necessary.

The final wider peacekeeping task to be discussed is the guarantee and denial of movement. This can be defined as those operations mandated to guarantee or deny movement by land, sea or air in particular areas and over certain routes. These operations overlap with conflict prevention measures and other wider peacekeeping missions. The missions can change suddenly if the mandate is challenged at the tactical level.

If the response requires the use of force, this can result in the loss of impartiality.¹⁹ Such challenges to a mandate can be considered as a crossing of the consent divide and therefore can change the operation to peace enforcement.

To complete these wider peacekeeping tasks, the British conduct pre-deployment contingent training. Training is very important in preparation for wider peacekeeping. The environment is likely to be dangerous, complex and stressful. The British recognize that young soldiers will often be in direct contact with belligerent parties. Junior personnel may have to handle tense situations or hold the situation in check until superiors can arrive. With this great responsibility on young soldiers training becomes very important.

Even with the very special nature of wider peacekeeping, many basic soldier qualities are still needed. "Professional competence, discipline, morale, leadership initiative, flexibility, and alertness will remain crucial elements of a contingent's operational effectiveness."²⁰ Thus, basic military skills provide the foundation for training a soldier for wider peacekeeping. This is also a fundamental premise of American doctrine. Both the British and the Americans maintain that well trained and well disciplined soldiers can meet the requirements of all forms of peace operations.

Basic soldier skills are still the required foundation. A theoretical knowledge of doctrine is important, too, for soldiers to act properly under pressure. With these considerations melded with the tasks to be performed from mission analysis, the commander can now look at specific training requirements and develop a training plan. The plan will consist of individual training and collective training. It will combine conceptual topics, area orientation, and special skills required

by the individuals. Collective training will address group skills and will be geared to team building.

The commander of the British battalion that deployed to Yugoslavia to escort humanitarian aid and protect safe havens developed a detailed training plan.²¹ The training program closely reflected the British Army's doctrine that well trained soldiers are a vital element in effective wider peacekeeping. As we observed earlier, the British Army starts with a doctrinal and theoretical explanation of the tasks to be learned. This doctrine is coupled with a detailed understanding of the mission area and the mission environment. Finally, well trained and well disciplined troops are oriented to the operation using their fundamental military expertise as the foundation for the new skills needed for the specific wider peacekeeping mission to be undertaken. Thus, what results is units composed of individuals who attain the objectives the British Army has set for wider peacekeeping missions.

The United States, like the British have developed new doctrine. And, like the British, the US is training troops according to the new doctrine. The US, however, has a slightly different perspective on middle ground operations, and on the use of force. The British, however, do offer a somewhat different doctrine that incorporates many features similar to that of US. The main differences between US and British doctrine are discussed in the following chapters.

CHAPTER 5

UNITED STATES PEACE OPERATIONS DOCTRINE

This chapter describes the United States Army's recently published peace operations doctrine. The specific areas of doctrine that are examined are: the types of peace operations, the principles, and variables of peace operations, and command and control of peace operations forces.

There are two Army publications that are significant in the articulation of peace operations doctrine. This doctrine is the subject of the recently published Field Manual (FM) 100-23, Peace Operations. FM 100-23 is a more detailed discussion of the doctrine that is briefly mentioned in an earlier document, Field Manual 100-5, Operations.

FM 100-5 is the keystone of Army doctrine. It provides the broad framework on how the US Army will conduct itself on a variety of missions under a variety of conditions. Doctrine is the basis for how the US Army trains and prepares for employment in support of national objectives.

The Army's doctrine lies at the heart of its professional competence. It is the authoritative guide to how Army forces fight wars and conduct operations other than war. As the Army's keystone doctrine, FM 100-5 describes how the army thinks about the conduct of operations. FM 100-5 undergirds all of the Army's doctrine, organization, training, material, leader development and soldier concerns . . . Doctrine captures the lessons of past wars, reflects the nature of war and conflict in its own time, and anticipates the intellectual and technological developments that will bring victory now and in the future.¹

The manual serves as the link between the National Military Strategy and the roles and missions of the Army. Peace operations are usually

conducted with great media coverage and often have a strategic context. Because of this publicity, decisions made at the tactical level can have immediate strategic and political repercussions.²

In order for soldiers at all levels to act decisively and correctly, they must be well prepared. This preparation is accomplished through training. The US Army has a reputation of being a "doctrine based Army." That means, in practical terms, the Army's ability to conduct operations is a manifestation of its written doctrine. This doctrine can be translated into operations by adherence to doctrine in training. This translation from doctrine to operations is greatly enhanced by the existence of the combat training centers: Joint Readiness Training Center, National Training Center and the Combat Maneuver Training Center.³

In order to understand peace operations doctrine, it is necessary to understand how that doctrine fits into the larger context of the Army's roles and missions. Peace operations fall within a set of military missions categorized as Operations Other Than War, OOTW. OOTW are

Non Combatant Evacuation	Arms Control
Support to Domestic Operations	Humanitarian and Disaster Relief
Security Assistance	Nation Assistance
Support to Counter Drug Operations	Combating Terrorism
Peacekeeping Operations	Peace Enforcement Operations
Show of Force	Attacks and Raids
Support for Insurgencies and Counterinsurgencies	

Figure 6 OOTW Missions

"military activities during peacetime and conflict that do not necessarily involve armed clashes between two organized forces."⁴

Within OOTW there are thirteen missions for the United States Army. This list is not exhaustive but is representative of the types of missions within OOTW.

Another way to look at OOTW is the following chart used by six military officers who were National Security Fellows at Harvard. Their chart lists OOTW and war within the range of military operations. Blockades are listed in the region covered by both a combat and noncombat. Additionally, this method of looking at OOTW considers peace enforcement, Non Combatant Evacuation (NEO), strikes, raids and shows of force existing within both combat and noncombat. This chart also shows what the goal the United States seeks to achieve by the use of the military.⁵ This is a practical way of looking at OOTW missions since

Range of Military Operations			
Military Operations		General US Goal	Examples
C O M B A T	War	Fight and Win	<u>Large scale combat operations</u> Attack Defend Blockades
	Operations Other Than War	Deter War & Resolve Conflict	Peace Enforcement Strikes Raids NEO Show of Force Counterterrorism Peacekeeping Counterinsurgency
	N O N C O M B A T	Promote Peace	Antiterrorism Disaster Relief Peacebuilding Nation Assistance Civil Support Counterdrug NEO

Figure 7 Fellows' Model

the use of the military in OOTW is something other than defeating the enemy as it is in war.

From OOTW there are two categories of peace operations, peacekeeping and peace enforcement. In FM 100-23, the additional category of support to diplomacy is listed as a category of peace operations.⁶ Support to diplomacy can have elements of many other categories of OOTW. This is explained as the first category of peace operations.

Military support to diplomacy consists of three sub-categories, peacemaking, peace building, and preventive diplomacy. These sub-categories take place in peace or conflict and are designed to prevent conflict. In support to diplomacy, military activities support and are subordinate to diplomatic initiatives. These actions may be typical peace time operations, such as forwardly deployed personnel who deter aggression. The objective of support to diplomacy is to use the military to create the conditions for a peaceful resolution of a situation.

Peacemaking is a process of diplomacy, mediation, negotiation, and/or other form of peaceful settlement that arranges an end to disputes and resolves issues that led to conflict. Security assistance is one component of OOTW that can be used for peacemaking. Combined military exercises may also enhance the diplomatic process by demonstrating United States willingness to become engaged abroad. Military to military contacts are another means of peacemaking.⁷

The next component of support to diplomacy is peace building. Peacebuilding consists of post conflict actions, including diplomatic actions, that strengthen and rebuild civil infrastructures and institutions in order to avoid a relapse into conflict. Peacebuilding normally requires cooperation between the military and civilian agencies. Some operations that fall into the category of peace building

are repair of civilian infrastructures, assistance in holding elections, and demobilization of former belligerents.⁸

The final category of support to diplomacy is preventive deployment. Preventive deployment involves diplomatic actions taken in advance of a predictable crisis to prevent or limit violence. It is the deployment of forces at the spot of potential crisis to deter violence. A preventive deployment can be the interpositioning of forces between parties to forestall violence. It can protect the local delivery of humanitarian aid. It can also assist local authorities to protect groups, services or the maintenance of law and order. Actions by a preventive deployment force include observing and reporting, patrolling and securing a border line, and shows of force. Preventive deployments have many similarities to peacekeeping operations, according to US Army doctrine. They can be multi-national and soldiers may carry weapons for self-defense. However, units preventively deployed will require a strike force with the capability to support the forces already on the ground. Further, the forces on the ground should have a reinforcement capability that is mobile and has good communications capabilities.

Peacekeeping is the second of the three categories of peace operations. The US definition is closely tied to definition cited earlier that is used by the Nordic nations and comes from the International Peace Academy. FM 100-23 defines peacekeeping as:

military or paramilitary operations that are undertaken with the consent of all major belligerents; designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an existing truce and support diplomatic efforts to reach long-term political settlement.⁹

Peacekeeping has two types of missions: observation and monitoring truces and cease-fires and truce supervision.

Observation and monitoring of truces and cease-fires requires military personnel to observe, monitor, verify, and report the

compliance by parties of a conflict to the cease-fire or truce. Observers must be impartial and serve under the authority granted by either an international mandate or an agreement. Supervision of a truce is described in US doctrine as a "traditional peacekeeping mission." Here supervisory troops interpose themselves between the parties often forming a buffer zone. The supervision of truces is accomplished by introducing forces into a conflict area to permit diplomatic negotiations to take place without conflict. These operations must have the consent of the parties to the conflict. Supervision of truces is different from monitoring and observing in two ways. First the number of forces required for supervision of truces is likely to be greater. Second, in supervision of truces, units have the ability to insist that parties comply with the agreement.¹⁰ Both are termed peacekeeping missions in US Army doctrine. They require consent of the parties, a truce exists, and they are designed to set the conditions for a diplomatic solution.

Thomas Adams, an instructor at the US Army Command and General Staff College, wrote that peacekeeping is organized around three core principles. Consent, an invitation from the host countries; impartiality; and force only in self defense. The purpose of these interventions was to respect and guarantee the sovereignty of the nation-states involved by deterring or redressing aggressive behavior.¹¹

Steven J. Argesinger, a senior US Army intelligence officer, supports Adams' model for peacekeeping operations. He maintains that peacekeeping requires the consent of the host country in the form of an invitation to the peacekeepers. He also agrees that peacekeepers must be impartial and use force only for self defense. Argesinger, however, feels that the US is poorly suited for peacekeeping. He maintains that

the US is a constant target for terrorism. In order for the US to properly defend its forces, the US must maintain a strong force capability that may be inconsistent with the lightly armed model of peacekeepers. Argersinger recommends that the US not engage in peacekeeping except peripherally. Peace enforcement, Argersinger maintains, also has the consent of the host government, but the peace operations units are willing to use force to impose a solution.¹²

Argersinger writes that the United States should not be committed to peacekeeping, only to peace enforcement. He believes that the US would never be viewed as impartial by the parties and the US serves as a symbol that would attract terrorist attention and thus degrade the peacekeeping effort. Also, he believes that US capabilities and training lend themselves to peace enforcement and not peacekeeping. The US can work with the United Nations or regional bodies to attain peace, but given her status in the world, the US is not currently properly suited for peacekeeping.¹³

Peace enforcement is the application of military force or the threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with generally accepted resolutions or sanctions.¹⁴ The purpose of peace enforcement, like peacekeeping, is to set the conditions for a diplomatic settlement.

There are six categories of peace enforcement missions. These categories are restoration and maintenance of order and stability, protection of humanitarian assistance, guarantee and denial of movement, the enforcement of sanctions, the establishment and supervision of protected zones, and the forcible separation of belligerents.¹⁵

The military can be used to restore or maintain order and stability within a state, or between states, when civilian authority is incapable.

When the civil situation has deteriorated to the point where even the distribution of humanitarian aid and services is endangered, military forces may be called upon to protect the humanitarian institutions. If delivery of humanitarian assistance is opposed, combat forces may be needed.¹⁶ This protection can range from safeguarding convoys of aid, to helping civil and military organizations to establish conditions where aid can be provided unhindered.

Operations to guarantee and deny movement by the use of the military, either allow freedom of operation or restrict movement on land, on the sea, or in the air. Operations that guarantee movement can be freedom of navigation operations that "may be conducted to ensure the freedom of ships to pass through a threatened sea lane, for aircraft to reach a besieged city or community, or to maintain safe passage on overland routes."¹⁷ Operations to deny movement include enforcement of air exclusion or no fly-zones and restriction of overland movement in areas or on specified routes.

The enforcement of sanctions is the denial of supplies, diplomatic and trading privileges and the freedom of movement to a sanctioned state or area. In order to be effective, sanctions require the consent of neighbor states and potential trading partners. Without the assistance of regional states, the enforcement of sanctions will be difficult due to smuggling or disregard for the sanctions. Sanctions need to be enforced in an organized manner. This requires planning and sufficient resources to prohibit the flow of unauthorized items. Military forces may serve as inspectors to prevent violations of sanctions. The use of force is, according to US doctrine, implicit in sanctions enforcement. Forces involved in sanctions enforcement require:

- Joint air, land and sea war fighting capabilities.
- The presence of heavy weapons.
- A heavy reliance on air and sea interdiction.

Execution of coordinated and uniform responses to all challenges to mandated sanctions.

Use of electronic emissions to ensure the safety of the task force.

A capability to sustain operation over extended periods of time.¹⁸

The forcible separation of belligerents is the intervention of military forces to establish peace against the will of one or more belligerent parties who seek to continue fighting. This can be done by using buffer zones or establishing lines for disengagement. One technique mentioned to separate belligerents is the reduction or elimination of the combat capability of one or more of the parties. In a dramatic understatement, FM 100-23 cautions commanders that "one or more of the belligerent parties may see this (reduction of combat power of a party) as cause for aggression against the peace enforcement force."¹⁹

As discussed in the preceding chapter, any belligerent who is being reduced or eliminated by peace enforcement against his will, is going to resist and seek opportunities for retribution. Another weakness in this technique concerns the reduction or elimination of multiple belligerents. In the case of multiple belligerents, the peace enforcement commander will find himself as the object of aggression from the very forces whose capabilities he is trying to reduce.

US Army doctrine ignores the basic right of self-defense for any combatant. If a combatant chooses not to be peacefully disengaged, the use of force to compel him to stop hostilities is an attack. Customary law allows combatants to resist attacks, even those conducted under a United Nations mandate. This may provide the belligerent with legitimate grounds to resist.

US Army doctrine on the forcible separation of belligerents states that "the degree of resistance may be proportional to the credibility of

the separating force."²⁰ The threat of force can be used as an inducement to encourage separation if the force has established the means and the will to force separation. Thus, the threat of force is preferred to the use of force as it does not establish a basis for reprisal. However, the threat of force, or any action to force separation of parties who want to keep fighting, is likely to engender ill will.

FM 100-23 offers commanders some considerations prior to forcibly separating belligerents. Commanders must consider:

- If sufficient forces are available to conduct the operation.
- The antagonism between the belligerent parties.
- The lethality of the weapons systems used by the belligerent parties.
- The degree of intermingling of the civilian population with the belligerent parties.
- The content of the mission mandate.²¹

FM 100-23 also offers a reminder; the end state is not the destruction of the belligerents, the end state is disengagement. Commanders must adjust operations to allow belligerents the option of disengagement or withdrawal. If the belligerents fail to disengage, the only recourse is to vigorously pursue forcible disengagement.²² However, forcing belligerents to disengage entails great risk and provokes retaliation.

The use of force to gain peace is not universally agreeable. Michael Renner wrote that the use of force to achieve political or diplomatic ends is equally distasteful, even if perpetrated by a United Nations mandated force. He wrote:

Humanity is faced with an anguishing dilemma. Continued reliance on military means-even by the United Nations on behalf of the world community-inevitably re-legitimizes the use of violence for political ends . . . In situations where the choice is no longer between violence and no violence, an armed intervention by the international community may be justifiable if it will result in the loss of fewer innocent lives than would be the case without such intervention.²³

As was noted earlier, peace enforcement is similar to peacekeeping because both are designed to create the conditions for a diplomatic settlement. The difference is that peace enforcement may include combat. Peacekeeping, by virtue of its impartial and consensual nature should not include combat. This does not preclude peacekeepers from using force for self-defense and to ensure freedom of movement.

US doctrine is similar to that of the British in maintaining that peacekeeping and peace enforcement are not on a linear continuum. As discussed in Chapter Four, the British place peacekeeping and wider peacekeeping on one side of a divide with peace enforcement on the other. This divide is the presence or absence of consent by the factions involved for the intervention of outside forces. US doctrine maintains three variables for peace operations: consent, use of force and impartiality. These three variables will define the nature of the peace operation and dictate the forces, equipment and training that the mission will require. Figure 8 describes the the variables in relation to the three types of peace operations.²⁴

In support to diplomacy, the level of consent and the level of impartiality are high and the level of force required will be low.

Note, for peacekeeping, the level of force required should be low


	Support to Diplomacy	Peace Keeping	Peace Enforcement
Consent	High	High	Low
Force	Low	Low (self-defense/ defense of mandate from interference)	Sufficient to compel/coerce
Impartiality	High	High	Low

Figure 8 FM 100-23 Model

and is only required for the protection of the mandate or self-defense of the forces deployed. The level of consent should be high since a peacekeeping deployment should be predicated on the parties consenting to outside intervention. In order for peacekeepers to maintain the consent of the parties they need to maintain a high level of impartiality.


In peace enforcement, consent of the parties may be low. While desirable, consent is not necessary for the peace enforcement force to be successful. With this absence of consent the level of force needed can be low or high, depending upon what is needed to secure the desired behavior by the parties to the conflict. The level of impartiality may then be low or high depending on what measures must be taken against a faction (or factions). Impartiality may be a matter of perception. While the peace enforcers may not favor one party over another, they may be forced to treat parties differently in order to achieve the desired end state. This unequal treatment could engender a perception of partiality. This partiality, however, does not limit the ability of peace enforcement forces to achieve success. Peace enforcement relies on the ability to compel. Impartiality is desirable, but the capability to compel minimizes the risks associated with appearing to be partial.

William J. Durch offered the graph listed as figure 9 to describe the relationship between the categories of peace operations. This graph accurately captures the US concept that the categories of peace operations are defined in relation to consent and the use of force.²⁵ Durch does not, however, address the US model's component of impartiality. But, as discussed in Chapter four, there is a relationship between consent and the absence of the use of force. The level of force employed is inversely related to consent, and the level of impartiality will be judged by the parties based on the amount of



force employed. If Durch were to consider consent simultaneously with impartiality in his model, his model would accurately reflect US doctrine. The similitude of consent and impartiality in US doctrine is described below.

Major David Last of the Canadian Army described the US continuum of peace operations with the following graph (figure 10). He wrote that the US model "suggests a transition between peacekeeping and peace enforcement is possible through a gradual escalation in force, commensurate with declining consent of one or more of the parties to the



conflict."²⁶ It is also noteworthy that Major Last has identified that there is a close connection between impartiality and consent. As has been noted earlier, impartiality is a necessity if a peace operations force is to maintain the consent of the belligerents. Just as Major Last depicts in his graph, consent and impartiality are parallel. In fact, Last is correct in placing impartiality further to the left on the X axis. There will be a higher level of impartiality shown by the peace force than there will be consent by the belligerents. The space between the arcs of consent and impartiality in Last's model are those aspects of consent not contingent upon the impartiality of the peace forces.

The variables listed in US doctrine are augmented by principles of peace operations. These principles are an adaptation of the principles of OOTW listed in FM 100-5, Operations. Like the principles of OOTW, the principles of peace operations provide guidance for the planning and conduct of the application of military power.

There are six principles of peace operations. These are objective, unity of effort, security, restraint, perseverance, and legitimacy.²⁷

The principle of objective is to "direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective."²⁸ In

order to plan and execute the mission to be conducted, a commander must know what is the desired end state, or the measure of success. Conversely, he must know what would constitute failure in order to avoid failing. In peace operations there is no concept of victory. The objective of peace operations is to set the condition for a diplomatic settlement.

In order to understand his objective, the commander must have a clear mandate with well defined terms of reference, and he must understand the desired end state for his operation. The terms of reference given to a commander must provide detailed guidance on the rules of engagement, requirements for force protection, delineation of the area of operation, mission completion or rotation dates, the status of belligerents and organizations in the area of operations, and a listing of available resources. FM 100-23 cautions commanders to insure that the mandate is clear. If the mandate is not clear, then commanders must gain approval for an interpretation of the mandate prior to departure. Likewise, commanders must understand the end state desired by higher headquarters all the way to the national command authorities. The military portion of a peace operation is not the end to be reached. It is a means to the end. The end is a diplomatic solution.²⁹

Just as the military portion of a peace operation is not the end to be achieved, the military itself is but one part of a team trying to resolve a situation. There may be representatives of several United Nations organizations, international and non governmental organizations, and private voluntary organizations in the mission area. These organizations have different leadership hierarchies. Since the military is not in charge of the efforts of these organizations, but the organizations will likely be pursuing a similar end, the military must try to gain cooperation toward the common end.³⁰ This is an area of

great US weakness. There is a lack of training in working in inter-agency environments, and there is a lack of qualified personnel in the US Army who possess the needed language skills and regional awareness to contend with the demands of inter-agency cooperation.³¹

The principle of security entails never allowing a hostile faction to acquire an unexpected advantage.²³ Security is a principle of peace operations of significant importance to the United States. Because of the media attention that can be gained from a violent attack on US troops, the United States takes significant force protection measures.

On 23 October 1983, a truck bomb detonated at the US Marine Barracks in Beirut, Lebanon, killing 243 Marines. These Marines were the US contribution to a multi-national peace operations force. The slaughter of these Marines, coupled with the domestic public outcry that followed, resulted in the withdrawal of US troops from the mission, and ultimately, the failure of the multinational venture until the situation subsided. In an effort to preclude another incident of this type, the United States continues to make great efforts at force protection.³³ The concern for force protection dominates the thinking of US forces deployed not only as peacekeepers, but all US forces deployed abroad.

US forces, even if invited in with the consent of all the parties concerned, have special requirements. Colonel Wolf Kutter wrote that US participation in peace operations are a high risk venture.

State sponsored terrorism, frustrated terrorist splinter groups, or covert operations by disputants--all can lead to massive US casualties. We must recognize that this kind of threat is serious and will not abate in the immediate future. Consequently, one can be on the benign end of the peacekeeping continuum, have no 'enemies,' yet still be subject to terrorist attacks.³⁴

Kutter recommends keeping several coalition states visible in peace operations. In this way it is not only US interests that are at stake,

but those of the whole coalition. Further, each of the member states can apply diplomatic pressure to potential attackers. Kutter's model is not completely supported by history, however. In Beirut, the French and the Italians, as well as the Americans were attacked. Unfortunately, the US suffered the most casualties. There is a feeling among some US allies that the US is not significantly more likely to be a target than other western powers.³⁵

Colonel Mallinson wrote about how the US views force protection in comparison to how it is viewed by the British. He wrote that the majority of US officers are concerned that peacekeeping operations are

inherently more risky than peace enforcement and therefore feel that the war fighting posture of a peace enforcement force gives them better force protection, whereas our instinct is that beyond a certain point the measures gain a momentum of their own and may attract trouble . . . It remains, however, a national prerogative, and given current policy guidelines I believe we will continue to see the US heavily insured in this area.³⁶

Legitimacy is sustaining the willing acceptance by the people of the right of the government to govern or a group or agency to make and carry out decisions. Legitimacy is required to be sustained in the minds of the people in the mission area, in the United States, within the forces deployed, and within the agencies involved in the peace operation. Impartiality, morality, legality and appropriateness of actions all provide the basis for the perception of legitimacy of a peace operation.³⁷ The United States permanent seat on the Security Council, and the US's recent history of success in obtaining United Nations mandates, can provide the US with mandates designed to meet the United States's interests.

One way to maintain local legitimacy is to adhere to the principle of restraint. Restraint requires the prudent application of appropriate military capability. The use of excessive force may be counter

productive and erode the legitimacy of an operation. The erosion of legitimacy could imperil force security by causing a retaliatory attack by the party that had been the victim of the use of excessive force. US doctrine, however, indicates that the US is not adverse to compromising the principle of restraint. This phrase from 100-23 has ominous consequences if the use of force, even for the stated purposes, alienates any of the parties that the US seeks to reconcile.

This principle does not preclude the application of sufficient or overwhelming force when required to establish situational dominance, to display US resolve and commitment, to protect US or indigenous lives and property, or to accomplish other critical objectives.³⁸

US forces training in the first OOTW rotation at the JRTC deployed with a mandate that allowed the use of force under the provisions of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, peace enforcement.³⁹ The US has a preference to deploy with a Chapter VII mandate for force protection reasons and for the US forces preferred role.

There is great concern that soldiers would lose their fighting edge if required to conduct peacekeeping and that the US is better suited for those peace operations closest to war.⁴⁰ However, this is not universally accepted by all US officers. Mallinson wrote that:

Restraint, the fundamental US principle of OOTW, is seen as potentially corrosive of the intense offensive-mindedness of US war fighting doctrine. When this is simply translated as "losing the Warrior spirit," the phrase belies the depth of the meaning. It is perhaps as well to recall the British army's concern prior to the Great War about losing "the Cavalry spirit" . . .not all officers seem to share the view that this is a big issue: a number of them (all Ranger/Airborne/SF war fighter types) told me that they saw restraint as something which ought to come easily to a trained soldier, and they resented the implication otherwise that, US soldiers lacked the appropriate discipline.⁴¹

Finally, perseverance is the sixth principle to be examined. Perseverance is the preparation for the measured, sustained application of military capability in support of strategic aims.⁴² Some peace

operations can be of long duration. For example the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) was established in 1948 and continues today. While UNTSO is the longest running United Nations peace operation, and most have been protracted, not all have been this lengthy. Of the thirteen missions established before 1985 mentioned in Chapter One, five are still active. Given these lengthy missions, the need to maintain national and international resolve becomes critical.

The final area presented in this Chapter is the command and control relationship of United States forces involved in peace operations. There are three types of command arrangements, unilateral US operations, multi-national operations with the US as the lead nation, and multi-national operations with the US in support.

Writing in 1993, Leo E. Keenan also described three command and control possibilities for the US. The United States could take the lead and primarily go it alone. The US could defer to the United Nations to lead. The US could also decide to act on a case by case basis. Keenan warned that if the US allowed the United Nations to lead, the US would have to embrace massive changes. Service under these circumstances would give new meaning to the term "diplomatic challenge." He reiterated the long standing US aversion to having its troops serve under foreign command.⁴³ (Despite this aversion, history shows that US troops served under allied commanders in both world wars and did, and still do, under NATO.)

In unilateral operations the United States acts alone and reports directly to the National Command Authorities. An example of a unilateral US peace operation is the US intervention in Somalia in 1992. Though the United Nations had forces deployed, UNISOM I, the US forces operated independently to distribute aid. Later the operation became a US lead coalition, and finally it combined to become a United Nations

operation, UNISOM II. Because the United States has tremendous resources, it is capable of projecting forces unilaterally to conduct many types of operations.

Multi-national operations can be more difficult to synchronize due to the differences in resource contributions by the various nations involved. However, multi-national operations have greater legitimacy than unilateral actions because they project a perception of international concurrence with the mission. In order to gain the maximum advantage out of a multi-national peace operation, commanders must take steps to coordinate activities. In order to get the maximum effect from a multi-national operation, a commander should establish a rapport with the leaders of the other contingents. This sense of team cooperation can overcome many cultural and material differences in the forces deployed.

The forces from other countries may have different institutions and conventions and should be afforded the same respect US forces wish to receive. Some nations may have limited resources to provide. An astute commander will seek ways to minimize material jealousy. Commanders must assign missions within the capabilities of the forces available. To do this a commander must make allowances for differences in training as well as equipment. A commander may have to cross level assets between nations to insure success and build good will. Liaison and communications between allies is needed to insure all forces are pursuing the same ends. Many times cultural and material differences can be overcome by effective liaison and communication.⁴⁴

When US forces are deployed as part of a multi-national force, the US commander must insure his forces are used in a manner consistent with the mandate and end state agreed to by the National Command Authorities (NCA). The senior US commander will normally be designated as the US

contingent commander. He must maintain the discipline of all US forces deployed and he will serve as the advisor to the Force Commander on matters of US interest. Each nation represented in a mission will designate a contingent commander to maintain discipline of national troops, to manage national administrative requirements and to serve as an advisor to the Force Commander on national issues.⁴⁵

The commander of the first US contingent to the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO), Colonel Wolf Kutter described three problems that can arise for US forces deployed as part of a coalition. The first problem is the potential discrepancies between the realities on the ground and the political concept. The discrepancies can be a function of the diplomatic ends not being achievable by the use of military means, or by policy makers becoming (or choosing to behave as if they are) ignorant of changes in the conditions on the ground. Next, tensions between the US contingent and the multinational force headquarters can occur since the US tends to be more aggressive in staff matters. The US takes commands from legitimate command authorities (the force headquarters) more seriously than other contingents who often tend to ignore inconvenient orders. Finally, there can be tensions within the US contingent if there are different standards between national contingents.⁴⁶ Failing to integrate attached units to the base maneuver force unit can also cause internal tensions.

A mission can require American military personnel who are not part of the main American contingent to be assigned to a multinational headquarters. As noted earlier in the discussion of Nordic doctrine, the national contingent has responsibilities for its soldiers' administration and logistics that are not provided on a multinational basis. Thus, Americans in the headquarters, but not part of the main US unit remain part of the US national contingent must draw support from

the US units in the mission area. Evaluations, awards, Uniform Code of Military Justice proceedings morale and welfare items, uniform and repair and replacement, and mail support are responsibilities of the US contingent. These considerations are very well defined in Nordic doctrine. They are virtually ignored in both US peace operations doctrine and British wider peacekeeping doctrine.

In Nordic doctrine the senior officer of each nation is designated as the contingent commander. He is responsible for insuring all administrative and logistic matters are completed for all soldiers and civilians serving on the mission. Though not specifically stated in Nordic doctrine, in return for receiving administrative and logistical support, nationals are expected to represent the interests of the contingent in matters. This is not done surreptitiously or to the detriment of non-nationals. Rather, it is done as a matter of advocacy in an environment where there is great competition for limited resources. The United States has yet to develop standardized procedures for members on contingents that are part of multinational headquarters. Using the Nordic's model would be worthwhile. That is, the United States should designate a senior officer on the ground in the mission area, not the Unified or Specified Commander, as the national contingent commander. He would insure that all United States personnel receive access to administrative and logistical support. In return, personnel in the contingent, but not under the contingent commander's supervision, would provide information that would be of interest to the commander and his superiors. Another area where the United States could learn from the Nordic model is in passing operational information with strategic importance back to the Pentagon. This is especially important in peace operations where tactical actions have strategic repercussions.

Because the Nordic countries have United Nations Departments at the

national level, and because their militaries are considerably smaller, their contingent commanders have a direct line to policy makers. The United States, because it has forces deployed around the globe under the supervision of Unified and Specified Commands, has a cumbersome system for passing information. No Unified or Specified Command would tolerate information skipping levels and going directly to Washington.

Unfortunately, with the development of near real time news reporting, media reports, both accurate and inaccurate, will find their way to decision makers before the military information chain can be completed. There is a need to keep the Unified or Specified Command in the information chain and to simultaneously satisfy the needs of desk officers in the Pentagon. A modification of the Nordic model would be useful. That is, have desk officers who represent the Unified or Specified Commander serve as the desk officer at the Pentagon, rather than a representative of the Army Staff, the Joint Staff or the Secretary of Defense's staff. This way the information chain is rapid, accurate and has the minimum required addressees.

In summary, this chapter described the three categories of peace operations, the variables that affect these categories, and the principles, and command relationships of US peace operations doctrine. The final chapter of this paper summarizes the evolution of peace operations doctrines, and the strengths, and potential shortcomings of US doctrine.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSIONS

This paper has examined the peacekeeping doctrine from the Nordic countries, the writings of the current leaders of the UN, British wider peacekeeping doctrine, and US peace operations doctrine. There are similarities between the various doctrines and there are differences. The similarities are the basic understanding that peace operations fall into different categories, that there are military operations outside the realm of war that are not peace operations, and that certain principles and tenets are common to each doctrine. Between the various doctrines, however, there are different terminologies to describe the types of operations and there are somewhat different approaches to how peace operations should be conducted. The US Army's doctrine reconciles the many new forms of missions described by Boutros Boutros-Ghali in An Agenda For Peace, with traditional peacekeeping missions of the Nordics and the British concept of wider peacekeeping. US peace operations doctrine is also faithful to the warrior ethic contained in Field Manual 100-5.

Nordic peacekeeping doctrine divides military peace operations into two categories, peacekeeping and United Nations military action. Peacekeeping is the type of operation that existed before 1985, where forces were deployed with the consent of the belligerents to be honest brokers as a confidence building measure. This type of operation required lightly armed, or unarmed military

personnel who used force for self-defense or freedom of movement. This thin blue line of peace keepers would be able to perform their duties based on respect for the United Nations. Peace keepers were diplomats, a role consistent with their office, since the mission of peace keepers is to create stability to set the conditions for peace. US doctrine accepts the Nordic concept of peacekeeping as one facet of peace operations. The US limits the applicability of the term "peacekeeping" to missions like truce supervision, observer missions and monitor missions.

The changes in peacekeeping over the last ten years have created new demands on Blue Berets. The current leadership of the United Nations, Boutros Boutros-Ghali and Kofi Annan, have attempted to articulate the new uses of the military in support of diplomatic efforts. Boutros-Ghali describes a wide range of missions for the military and for the economic, political and informational elements of power. He unites the elements of power under the direction of the United Nations. In his doctrine, the United Nations will lead multi-national efforts to secure peace and stability. Boutros Boutros-Ghali's multi-lateral approach requires states to surrender too much power to the United Nations. Additionally, the leadership of the United Nations does not understand that the missions tasked to Blue Berets do not fall on a linear continuum. The United Nations's leadership understands that the new missions are different from traditional peacekeeping, but they do not understand that the differences can have a dramatic impact on the likelihood of member states to support the operations. This is especially true in peace enforcement where member states are likely to be reluctant to place their soldiers under the command of the Secretary General. While Nordic and British doctrine accept the leadership of the United

Nations, US doctrine does not. The US, probably, will choose to lead a coalition under the authority of a UN mandate, as in the Gulf War. The US will seek to stabilize the situation for transfer to the UN, but in the meanwhile, the UN's role may be marginalized, as in Somalia.

The British doctrine of wider peacekeeping attempts to address many of the mission that Boutros Boutros-Ghali discusses in his work. The British, like the Americans, have created a model where traditional peacekeeping is like peacekeeping as described by the Nordics. Additionally, there is another category of peacekeeping operations that is similar to traditional peacekeeping, but has expanded requirements. These additional missions are termed wider peacekeeping. Likewise, there is another category of peace operations, peace enforcement, that is different from peacekeeping. Peacekeeping and wider peacekeeping both require the consent of the belligerents at the operational level. At the tactical level, there may be tolerable, local breaches of consent. In peace enforcement there is no consent at the operational level. Due to the differences in the level of consent to the intervention by the belligerents, there will be different training requirements and different resources required. British doctrine draws heavily on the writings of Boutros Boutros-Ghali, and also quotes from US Army FM 100-5. The British use the definitions of peacekeeping and peace enforcement from FM 100-5 to illustrate and establish the baseline for the missions in these two categories. There are many similarities between British and US doctrine. However, US doctrine differs by including middle ground operations under peace enforcement that the British would consider wider peacekeeping.¹ The US has a tendency to conduct peace operations with more latitude

in the use of force. This tendency will change how US coalition partners must organize, train and support their forces when deployed under US leadership. Even if their forces are not under US leadership, use of force by the US could endanger units of allied nations. Belligerents may not care to distinguish between nationalities if they are attacked by peace forces.

United States doctrine is greatly influenced by the work of Boutros Boutros-Ghali. In FM 100-5 and FM 100-23, the United States accepts many of the categories of peace operations articulated by Boutros Boutros-Ghali. The US doctrine does perhaps the best job of any doctrine in describing the three main variables that define peace operations: consent, impartiality and the use of force. The US doctrine, however, does not adequately address the inter relationship of these three variables.

Though the US doctrine identifies these variables, US doctrine renders these considerations moot by the over-reliance on the use of force. This over-reliance on the use of force is an American dynamic that is self contradictory. Doctrinally, we maintain that force is only one element of conflict resolution. But, the US is not adequately prepared for the complexities of conducting the liaison and negotiations necessary to reduce tensions. Soldiers lack foreign language skills necessary for liaison; there are insufficient Foreign Area Officers to adequately integrate political and military considerations in the ever increasing number of mission areas, and the US military has not yet developed the ability to integrate the capabilities of civilian agencies into the peace operations environment.²

Further, US doctrine maintains that the US always has the option of using force. This use of force can be under the guise of

force protection. Since the attack on the Marine barracks in Beirut in October 1983, the US has taken force protection extremely seriously. However, as pointed out earlier, excessive force protection measures can be counter-productive; so can over reliance on the use of force.

The US may delegate authority to use force to the operational level in mandates and Rules of Engagement (ROE). By doing so, the commander on the ground has less incentive to try to negotiate solutions given the capacity to compel compliance. Over reliance on deterrence with retribution may be a weakness in our doctrine. It could also reflect a crutch which prevents the US from trying to overcome our lack of ability to negotiate. Compelling or deterring with force can be more gratifying domestically. It can, however, seriously intimidate belligerents and be counter-productive to a negotiated, long lasting solution. The US, by virtue of what she symbolizes and her ability to influence affairs anywhere on the globe will have to learn to balance force protection with unwarranted intimidation and potential provocation.

No other nation on earth has the US capability to project force around the globe. One result of this power projection capability is that US forces may be deployed for peacekeeping or support to diplomacy. However, the US is capable to interject additional forces into the area. These forces will then compel the belligerent(s) to adhere to the will of the US. Thus, the mission is transformed from peacekeeping or support to diplomacy into peace enforcement. For example, in FM 100-23 the US doctrine advises that forces on a preventive deployment maintain an offshore or out-of-area strike capability. This strike capability is designed as a reaction force if required for self-defense. The presence of this

capability to interject force is contrary to the very concept of a preventive deployment. If the reaction force is needed, then the preventive deployment has failed since the force is now under attack. Use of a strike force in a preventive deployment actually puts a preventive deployment into the category of peace enforcement, that is the threat of force rather than negotiation is used to coerce a belligerent.

This dynamic of an armed strike to overwhelm belligerents is understandable in light of the US Viet Nam experience.³ The US has adopted, especially when Colin Powell was the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a policy of overwhelming force. This policy manifests itself in US peace operations doctrine in the often stated requirement for retaliatory capabilities. This is a dynamic not described in any other nations' peace operations doctrine.

The British, since they anticipate having to deploy with the US in the future, have been advised by their liaison officers in the US to understand that the US will have a lower threshold for restraint on the use of force. They advised that British forces deployed with the US either deploy with the capability to transition from wider peacekeeping to peace enforcement, or to have the ability to rapidly rearm or to be able to rapidly depart.⁴

This over-reliance by the US on its force projection capability is tied very deeply to the doctrinal principle of security. The US, understandably, wants to insure the security of her forces. However, the Nordic countries' doctrine discusses the need not to provoke retaliation by a party. The United States needs to balance security with desire for respect of the parties. The constant threat of overwhelming US retaliation could provoke tactical and operational preemptive attacks. Belligerent parties

may feel cornered, having no options for negotiation. There should be more emphasis in creating the means to negotiate, more training on persuasion and fewer built in mechanisms for retaliation. While the US doctrine does address the many categories of peace operations, the reliance on force and force projection makes vague the differentiation of the categories. The United States appears to be prepared to constantly raise the stakes to the level of peace enforcement. In doing so, the US may invite retaliation.

There is an unlikely ally for the belief that the US should maintain a retaliatory capability for its peacekeeping forces. F. T. Liu, writing for the International Peace Academy, maintained that a two tier approach to peace operations is needed. He believes the first tier would fulfill normal peace keeper duties and serve as a trip wire for a second tier force stationed just off shore or nearby. This second tier would be a special task force from the military of a permanent member(s) of the Security Council, while the first tier would be made up of troops from countries that historically contributed to peace operations. The second tier would use force to insure the first tier force could complete its mission.⁵ US doctrine agrees with this concept. US, because of its concerns for force protection would not accept placing first tier forces at risk while they await the second tier response.

Renner argued that the use of military force to compel parties may be just as undesirable as the conflict without intervention. Intervention, he argues, should only occur if the intervention will preclude more hardship than would occur without intervention.⁶ The Red Cross has maintained that it can only succeed in maintaining its effectiveness by avoiding association with any military operations lest their efforts be seen as

partisan.⁷ By considering the dissent to the use of force by those like Renner and the Red Cross, the United States can learn the value of utilizing the military only as a last resort as discussed in the Powell doctrine. However, when the US chooses to commit the military it should consider Argersinger's advice to conduct peace enforcement, not peacekeeping.⁸ If the US conducts peacekeeping it will inevitably insure its force protection by maintaining a retaliatory capability. This capability can lead to intimidation and thus be counterproductive.

In order for the United States to operate with its current doctrine that relies on force projection, all US forces used in peace operations must deploy as peace enforcers, or be prepared to accept a rapid transition to peace enforcement or hostilities. Given the US concerns for force protection and her doctrine for the use unilateral retributive actions, the United States might be well advised to avoid peacekeeping in favor of peace enforcement.

The United States can develop its capabilities to negotiate and conduct its operations as part of an interagency team to overcome these weaknesses. Despite these weakness in our capabilities, the United States' current doctrine is adequate to meet the challenges of peace operations, but is better suited for peace enforcement. This remains true as long as the US trains, arms and resources its forces with capability for the rapid transition from peace operations to war.

ENDNOTES

Chapter 1

¹Department of the Army, Peace Operations Briefing, Joint Readiness Training Center, Fort Polk, September 1994.

²Joint Nordic Committee for Military UN Matters. Nordic UN Staff Officers Course: Classroom Lectures, Subject: Introduction to Peace Keeping, Almas, Sweden: Joint Nordic Committee for Military UN Matters, 8 November 1993. This lecture was presented by Per Erik Korstrom, LTC Swedish Army, Director, Swedish UN Training Center, 8 November 1993.

³Michael Renner, . Critical Juncture, The Future of Peace Keeping, World Watch Paper 114, (Washington, D.C., World Watch Institute, May 1993), 5-9.

⁴Donald W. Snow, Peacekeeping, Peacemaking and Peace-Enforcement: The United States Role in the New International Order, (Carlisle Barracks: United States Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, February 1993), 4-6.

⁵Ibid., 15-20.

⁶British Army. Army Field Manual: Wider Peacekeeping Fifth Draft, Revised, (London: Ministry of Defense, 1994), i.

⁷Department of the Army, Field Manual 100-5: Operations, (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 14 June 1993), 13-7.

⁸Department of the Army, Field Manual 100-23: Peace Operations, (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 30 December 1994), 105.

⁹Ibid., 111.

¹⁰Ibid., 112.

¹¹Ibid., 111.

¹²Ibid., 112.

¹³Ibid., 111.

¹⁴United Nations. Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court Of Justice. (New York: Department of Public Information, United Nations, 1990), 19-28.

¹⁵Charles C. Moskos, Jr. Peace Soldiers: The Sociology of a United Nations Military Force. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976), 15-16.

¹⁶United Nations, United Nations Peacekeeping. (New York: Department of Public Information, United Nations, 1993), 5-7.

¹⁷Moskos, 13-26.

¹⁸Ibid., 24-25.

Chapter 2

¹Nordic UN Project, The Agencies at a Crossroads: The Role of Specialized Agencies. (Stockholm, Sweden: Nordic UN Project, 1990), 41-45.

²Lectures, Subject: Military Personnel, (Almas, Sweden: Joint Nordic Committee for Military UN Matters, 8 November 1993). This lecture was presented as small group instruction by Major H. H. Johansson, Director of Personnel, Danish UN Department, Danish Ministry of Defense.

³Lectures, Subject: Observer Missions, (Almas, Sweden: Joint Nordic Committee for Military UN Matters, 10 November 1993). This lecture was presented by BG Bo Pellnas, Swedish Army, Chief Military Observer, UN Protection Force, Former Yugoslavia.

⁴Joint Nordic Committee for Military UN Matters, Nordic UN Tactical Manuals: Volumes I. (Almas, Sweden: Joint Nordic Committee for Military UN Matters, 1992), 22.

⁵Ibid., 22-23.

⁶Douglas J. Bennet, Speech to the Geneva Consulting Group, (Geneva, Switzerland: US Department of State, 20 April 1994).

⁷International Peace Academy. Peacekeepers Handbook, (New York: Peremon Press, 1984), 38.

⁸Lectures, Subject: Human Rights: The Legal Implications of UN Duty. (Almas, Sweden: Joint Nordic Committee for Military UN Matters, 9 November 1993). This lecture was given by Miss Andrea Ingvarsson, an attorney for the Swedish Red Cross.

⁹Nordic UN Tactical Manuals: Volumes I. 24.

¹⁰Ibid., 26.

¹¹Ibid.

¹²International Peace Academy, United Nations Peace Keeping and the Non Use of Force. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992), 39.

¹³Ibid., 11.

¹⁴Nordic UN Tactical Manuals: Volumes I. 26.

¹⁵Ibid.

¹⁶Lectures, Subject: Human Rights: The Legal Implications of UN Duty. (Almas, Sweden: Joint Nordic Committee for Military UN Matters, 9 November 1993).

¹⁷Lectures, Subject: Coordination Between the Military, Political and Civilian Components, (Almas, Sweden: Joint Nordic Committee for Military UN Matters, 16 November 1993). This lecture was presented by Mr. P. O. Hallqvist, Chief Administrative Officer, United Nations Assistance Mission In Rwanda. Mr. Hallqvist commanded the Swedish Contingent in UNEF II (as a Swedish Army Colonel) and was an administrative officer in UNPROFOR.

¹ ⁸Kofi A. Annan, "UN Peacekeeping Operations and Cooperation with NATO," NATO Review, VOL 41, (Mons, Belgium: October 1993), 3-7.

¹⁹Nordic UN Tactical Manuals: Volumes I. 27.

²⁰Ibid.

²¹Ibid.

²²Lectures, Subject: Peace Keeping From the Force Commanders' Perspective, (Almas, Sweden: Joint Nordic Committee for Military UN Matters, 16 November 1993). This lecture was presented by LTG Lars Whalgren, Swedish Army. He is a graduate of the USA, CGSC and was the former Force Commander of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon and UNPROFOR.

²³Nordic UN Tactical Manuals: Volumes I. 29-32.

²⁴John B. Hunt, "Thoughts on Peace Support Operations," Military Review, Vol. LXXIV, No. 10, (Ft Leavenworth, KS: October, 1994), 76-77.

²⁵Michael Renner, Critical Juncture: The Future of Peacekeeping, Worldwatch Paper 114. (Washington: Worldwatch Institute, May 1993), 37.

²⁶William Durch, The Evolution of United Nations Peace Keeping, (New York: St Martin's Press, 1993), 7-8.

²⁷Ibid., 7-12.

²⁸Ibid.

²⁹Bennet, Douglas J., Speech to the Geneva Consulting Group, (Geneva, Switzerland: US Department of State, 20 April 1994).

Chapter 3

¹Annan, Kofi A., "The Path of Peace-Keeping: Translating Commitment Into Action," Harvard International Review. Vol. 15 (Summer 1993), 34-45, 67-68.

²Hunt, John B., "Thoughts on Peace Support Operations," Military Review. Vol. LXXIV, No 10, (October, 1994), 76-77.

³Boutros Boutros Ghali, An Agenda for Peace, (New York: Department of Public Information, United Nations, 1993), 11.

⁴Ibid.

⁵Ibid., 13.

⁶Ibid.

⁷Ibid., 14.

⁸Ibid., 15.

⁹For example, the US Army aided in cleaning up the nuclear accident at Three Mile Island in Pennsylvania, and the US Army has frequently assisted in fighting forest fires in the Northwest. The requirement for the Department of Defense to support the environment and other non war fighting missions is contained in the current National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, (Washington D.C.: February 1995) 18.

¹⁰Thomas K. Adams, "Peace Operations," Operations Other Than War, (Ft Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College), 279.

¹¹Boutros Boutros Ghali, An Agenda for Peace, 18-19.

¹²Ibid., 11.

¹³Ibid., 22-25.

¹⁴Ibid., 22.

¹⁵Ibid., 24.

¹⁶Ibid., 23.

¹⁷Ibid., 32.

¹⁸Ibid., 32-33.

¹⁹Boutros Ghali, "An Agenda for Peace, One Year Later," Orbis, Vol. 37, (Summer 1993), 323-332.

²⁰Boutros Boutros Ghali, An Agenda for Peace, 24.

²¹Ibid., 25.

²²Ibid.

²³Annan, Kofi A., "UN Peacekeeping Operations and Cooperation with NATO." NATO Review, Vol 41, (Mons: Belgium: October 1993), 3-7.

²⁴Annan, Kofi A., "The Path of Peace-Keeping: Translating Commitment Into Action," Harvard International Review, Vol. 15, (Summer 1993), 34-45, 67-68.

²⁵Boutros Boutros Ghali, An Agenda for Peace, 11.

²⁶Boutros Ghali, "An Agenda for Peace, One Year Later," Orbis, Vol 37, (Summer 1993), 323-332.

²⁷Leon Gordenker, and Thomas G. Weiss,, eds., Soldiers, Peacekeepers and Disasters, (New York: St. Martins Press, 1991), 29-30.

²⁸Boutros Ghali, "An Agenda for Peace, One Year Later," Orbis, Vol 37, (Summer 1993), 323-332.

²⁹Ibid.

³⁰Donald Snow, Peacekeeping, Peacemaking and Peace-Enforcement: The United States Role in the New International Order, (Carlisle Barracks: US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, February 1993), 4.

³¹Ibid, 19.

³²Kofi A. Annan, "The Path of Peace-Keeping: Translating Commitment Into Action," Harvard International Review, Vol. 15, (Summer 1993), 34-45, 67-68.

³³Gordenker., 29.

³⁴Adams., 279.

Chapter 4

¹British Army. Army Field Manual: Wider Peacekeeping (Fifth Draft, Revised) (London: Ministry of Defense, 1994),p. i.

²Ibid.

³Ibid., C-3

⁴Ibid., iii.

⁵Ibid.

⁶Ibid.

⁷Ibid., 2-5.

⁸Ibid., 2-5 - 2-8.

⁹Wolf D. Kutter, Operational Guidelines for US Peacekeeping Force Commanders, (Carlisle Barracks: US Army War College, 7 April 1986), 8.

¹⁰Larry Forester, Peace Operations: Forging the Instruments and Keeping the Edge, (Carlisle Barracks: US Army War College, 1993), 29.

¹¹Ibid.

¹²International Peace Academy. United Nations Peacekeeping and the Non-Use of Force, (New York: International Peace Academy, 1992), 12.

¹³Alan Munro, "A New World Disorder? Crisis Management Post Cold War," RUSI Journal, Vol. 140, No. 1, (London, February, 1995), 20.

¹⁴Germond, Thierry, Cooperation Between ICRC and UNPROFOR in the Former Yugoslavia, (London: International Red Cross, 22 February 1994).

¹⁵Comments by General Jean Cot, French Army, Oct 29, 1993, at OP S-51, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

¹⁶British Army Field Manual, Wider Peace Keeping, 2-10.

¹⁷Ibid., 3-5.

¹⁸Ibid., 3-11

¹⁹Ibid.

²⁰Ibid., 7-4.

²¹P. J. Durrant, Enclosures to a letter by COL P. J. Durrant, British Army Liaison Officer to the Combined Arm Center, to the Director of the Leadership Instruction Department, US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, Subject: British Peace Keeping Training.

²²Ibid.

²³Ibid.

²⁴Ibid.

²⁵Ibid.

²⁶Ibid.

²⁷Ibid.

²⁸Ibid.

Chapter 5

¹Department of the Army, Field Manual 100-5: Operations. (Washington, D.C., Headquarters, Department of the Army, 14 June 1993), v.

²Department of the Army, Field Manual 100-23: Peace Operations. (Washington, D.C., Headquarters, Department of the Army, 30 December 1994), 1.

³A. L. Mallinson, Enclosures to a Letter to Colonel Thurman, CDD, Subject: US/UK Doctrinal Divergence, (Ft Leavenworth, KS: 20 September 1994).

⁴FM 100-5, .Glossary 6.

⁵Ronald Bath, et al. Roads to New Strength: Preparing Leaders for Military Operations Other Than War, (Boston: National Security Program, Harvard University, 6 May 1994), 3.

⁶FM 100-23, 2.

⁷FM 100-23, 2.

⁸FM 100-23, 2.

⁹FM 100-23, 112.

¹⁰FM 100-23, 5.

¹¹Adams., 279.

¹²Steven J. Argersinger, Peacekeeping, Peace Enforcement, and the United States. (Carlisle Barracks: US Army War College, 1991), i-ii

¹³Argersinger., i-ii.

¹⁴FM 100-23, 6.

¹⁵FM 100-23, 7.

¹⁶Ibid, 8.

¹⁷Ibid.

¹⁸Ibid, 9-10.

¹⁹Ibid, 10-11.

²⁰Ibid.

²¹Ibid, 11-12.

²²Ibid.

²³Michael Renner, Critical Juncture: The Future of Peacekeeping. Worldwatch Paper 114. (Washington: Worldwatch Institute, May 1993), 47-48.

²⁴FM 100-23, 12-14.

²⁵Durch, William J. ed. The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping: Case Studies and Comparative Analysis. (New York, St. St Martins Press, 1993), 5.

²⁶Last, David, Entrance, Exit and Transition Criteria for peace operations: A Research Note, (St Hubert, Quebec, Canada: Land Forces Command Headquarters, 23 March 1994), 2/8.

²⁷FM 100-23, 15-19.

²⁸Ibid, 15-16.

²⁹Ibid, 15-16.

³⁰Ibid, 16.

³¹Bath, v.

³²FM 100-23, 16.

³³An example of US efforts at force protection is Camp Able Sentry in Skopje, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, which is heavily protected.

³⁴Kutter, 34

³⁵Remarks by an allied flag officer to the USA, Command and General Staff College, Ft Leavenworth, KS, 1994-1995.

³⁶Mallinson.

³⁷FM 100-23, 18.

³⁸Ibid.

³⁹JRTC Briefing; and Mallinson.

⁴⁰Argesinger., v-26; and Kutter, 19-20.

⁴¹Mallinson.

⁴²FM 100-23, 17-18.

⁴³Leo Keenan, United States Peacekeeping Operations: The Need For Policy and Procedures. (Carlisle Barracks: US Army War College, 5 May 1993), 20-21.

⁴⁴FM 100-23, 21-27.

⁴⁵Ibid.

⁴⁶Kutter, 26-27.

Chapter 6

¹Mallinson, A.L.

²Bath, v-11.

³Snow, 33-35.

⁴Mallinson.

⁵F.T. Liu, F.T., International Peace Academy. United Nations Peace Keeping and the Non Use of Force. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992), 43.

⁶Renner., 37-38

⁷Germond.

⁸Argersinger., ii.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books

- Baker, Alfred W. Peacekeeping: A New Role for US Forces. Student Paper. Carlisle Barracks: US Army War College, 1983.
- Boutros-Ghali, Boutros. An Agenda For Peace. Report of the Secretary General Pursuant to the Statement Adopted by the Summit Meeting on 31 January 1992. New York: Department of Public Information, United Nations, 1993.
- British Army. Army Field Manual: Wider Peacekeeping (Fifth Draft, Revised) London: Ministry of Defense, 1994.
- Durch, William J. ed. The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping: Case Studies and Comparative Analysis. New York, St. Martins Press, 1993.
- Gordenker, Leon., ed. Soldiers, Peacekeepers and Disasters. New York: St. Martins Press, 1991.
- International Peace Academy. Peacekeepers Handbook. New York: Peremon Press, 1984.
- International Peace Academy. United Nations Peace Keeping and the Non Use of Force. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992.
- Joint Nordic Committee for Military UN Matters. Nordic UN Tactical Manuals: Volumes I and II. Almas, Sweden: Joint Nordic Committee for Military UN Matters, 1992.
- Moskos, Charles C., Jr. Peace Soldiers: The Sociology of a United Nations Military Force. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976.
- Nordic UN Project. The Agencies at a Crossroads: The Role of Specialized Agencies. Stockholm, Sweden: Nordic UN Project, 1990.
- United Nations. United Nations Peacekeeping. New York: Department of Public Information, United Nations, 1993.
- United Nations. Basic Facts About the United Nations. New York: Department of Public Information, United Nations, 1992.

United Nations. Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court Of Justice. New York: Department of Public Information, United Nations, 1990.

United States Government. National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement. Washington D.C.: US Government Printing Office: February 1995.

Papers

Adams, Thomas K. "Peace Operations." Operations Other Than War, (Ft Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College), 279.

Argesinger, Steven J. Peacekeeping, Peace Enforcement, and the United States. Student Paper. Carlisle Barracks: US Army War College, 1991.

Ayers, Charles M. Peacekeeping Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures. Center for Low Intensity Conflict Paper. Langley Air Force Base: US Army-Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict, April 1989.

Bath, Ronald J. Roads to New Strength: Preparing Leaders for Military Operations Other Than War (Final Draft). Boston: National Security Program, Harvard University, 6 May 1994.

Forster, Larry M. Peace Operations: Forging the Instruments and Keeping the Edge. Student Paper. Carlisle Barracks: US Army War College, 1993.

Keenan, Leo E., III. United States Peacekeeping Operations: The Need For Policy and Procedures. Student Paper. Carlisle Barracks: US Army War College, 1993.

Kutter, Wolf D. Operational Guidelines for US Peacekeeping Commanders. Student Paper. Carlisle Barracks: US Army War College, 1986.

Last, David, Entrance, Exit and Transition Criteria for Peace Operations: A Research Note, (St Hubert, Quebec, Canada: Land Forces Command Headquarters, 23 March 1994)

Renner, Michael. Critical Juncture: The Future of Peacekeeping. Worldwatch Paper 114. Washington: Worldwatch Institute, May 1993.

Snow, Donald M. Peacekeeping, Peacemaking and Peace-Enforcement: The United States Role in the New International Order. Carlisle Barracks: US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, February 1993.

Articles

- Annan, Kofi A. "The Path of Peace-Keeping: Translating Commitment Into Action." Harvard International Review Vol. 15 (Summer 1993) 34-45, 67-68.
- Annan, Kofi A. "UN Peacekeeping Operations and Cooperation with NATO." NATO Review Vol. 41 (October 1993) 3-7.
- Boutros-Ghali, Boutros. "An Agenda For Peace: One Year Later." Orbis Vol. 37 (Summer 1993) 323-332.
- Boutros-Ghali, Boutros. "UN Peacekeeping in a New Era: a New Chance for Peace." World Today Vol. 49 (April 1993) 68-69.
- Center For Army Lessons Learned. "Operations Other Than War: Volume IV, Peace Operations." CALL Newsletter. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Lessons Learned, No. 93-8 (December 1993).
- Diehl, Paul F. "Institutional Alternatives to Traditional UN Peacekeeping: An Assessment of Regional and Multinational Options." Armed Forces and Society Vol. 19 (Winter 1993) 209-230.
- Mackenzie, Lewis. "Military Realities of UN Peacekeeping Operations." Royal United Services Institute Journal Vol. 138 (February 1993) 21-24.
- Rifkind, Malcolm. "Peacekeeping of Peacemaking? Implications and Prospects." Royal United Services Institute Journal, Vol. 138 (April 1993) 1-6.
- Wilson, George C. "New Breed of Officers Needed For Peacekeeping." Army Times (18 July 1994) 37.

Unpublished Sources

- Bennet, Douglas J., Speech to the Geneva Consulting Group, Geneva, Switzerland, 20 April 1994.
- Cot, Jean. General, French Army, Force Commander UN Protection Force., During visit to Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia Command, 29-30 October 1993.
- Durrant, P. J., Enclosures to a Letter to the Director of the Leadership Instruction Department, Subject: US/UK Doctrinal Divergence, Ft Leavenworth, KS: 20 September 1994.
- Germond, Thierry. The Theory and Practice of Peacekeeping: Cooperation

Between the ICRC and UNPROFOR in the Former Yugoslavia. London:
22 February 1994.

Joint Nordic Committee for Military UN Matters. Nordic UN Staff
Officers Course: Lectures, Handouts and Course Notes. Almas,
Sweden: Joint Nordic Committee for Military UN Matters, November,
1993.

Department of the Army, Peace Operations Briefing, Joint Readiness
Training Center and Fort Polk, September, 1994.

Mallinson, A.L., Enclosures to a Letter to Colonel Thurman, Subject:
US/UK Doctrinal Divergence, Ft Leavenworth, KS: 20 September
1994.

United States Government Documents

Department of the Army, Field Manual 100-5: Operations. Washington,
D.C., Headquarters, Department of the Army, 14 June 1993.

Department of the Army, Field Manual 100-23: Peace Operations.
Washington, D.C., Headquarters, Department of the Army, 30
December 1994.